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CONFESSING IN THE HUMAN VOICE: A DEFENSE OF THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
by Andrew E. Taslitz*
I. Introduction
A. Miranda’s Crumbling Foundations
Miranda v. Arizona1 famously mandates that those subjected to custodial interrogation be
entitled to counsel during that process and be warned of that right and of their right “to silence.”
Custodial interrogation can proceed absent compliance with these mandates only if the suspect
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives his rights.2 To the surprise of many
commentators, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Miranda’s constitutional
status in Dickerson v. United States.3
Yet this supposed civil libertarian victory in Dickerson was a pyrrhic one. The Dickerson
Court’s reaffirming Miranda rested largely on stare decisis, for Miranda had “become embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national
culture.”4 Yet the Court offered no serious defense of Miranda’s inherent wisdom as a
constitutional rule, indeed arguably expressing some skepticism about that wisdom, or at least
pointedly steering clear of defending it. Thus, said the Court, “Whether or not we agree with
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College, 1978; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1981. The author thanks his wife, Patricia V. Sun,
Esquire, and Professors John Conley, Richard Leo, Robert Mosteller, and George Thomas for their comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. Appreciation goes as well to the author’s research assistants, Stacy Chaffin, Keri Fiore,
William Jacobs, and Adrienne Moran.
1
384 U.S. 486 (1966).
2
See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS, & LENESE HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 734-37 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining Miranda’s waiver rule).
3
530 U.S. 428 (2000); see TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 703-07 (analyzing commentators’ pre-andpost-Dickerson theories concerning Miranda’s viability and meaning).
4
530 U .S. at 443.

Miranda’s reasoning and the resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.”5
This failure to offer a reasoned defense of Miranda’s constitutional logic as a matter of
principle still left a cloud over Miranda’s legitimacy, for the Court simply failed to confront the
withering and growing criticism of the case. 6 Critics, mostly on the right of the political
spectrum, have long challenged whether Miranda could be rooted in the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination - - Miranda’s purported constitutional home - - under any
acceptable theory of “legal” interpretation.7 These critics further questioned whether Miranda’s
costs, in terms of suppressed confessions and lost convictions of the guilty, justified its marginal
or non-existent benefits in deterring abusive police interrogations.8 Moreover, maintained critics
across the political spectrum, there were better ways to regulate police abuses than Miranda, for
example, by requiring the videotaping of the entire custodial interrogation process, from start to
finish.9 Other critics, mostly on the left, maintained that Miranda never served as an adequate
deterrent because police readily obtained “waivers” or otherwise circumvented the Miranda
rule.10 Likewise, complained this last group of critics, Miranda governed only whether

5

Id. at.
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW U.L. REV. 387 (1996)
[hereinafter Social Costs] (arguing that Miranda results in the acquittal of too many serious felons for little benefit);
Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW U.L. REV. 1084 (1996)
[hereinafter Grand Illusion] (responding to critics of Cassell’s position); JOSEPH GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH,
AND THE LAW (1993) (book-length critique of Miranda as lacking a defensible constitutional foundation). But see
Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 266 (1996) (disputing the claim that
Miranda has lowered the confession rate); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOL. 621 (1996) (arguing that Miranda has had a profoundly positive impact on professionalizing police
practices and educating the public about constitutional rights).
7
See GRANO, supra note 6, at 119-98.
8
See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 6; Cassell, Grand Illusion, supra note 6.
9
See, e.g., William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW,
JUSTICE, AND POLICING 303, 303-13 (Richard L. Leo & George Thomas, III, ed.s 1998) (positive view of
videotaping by the then-Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum); Cassell, Social Costs, supra
note 6, at 486-89 (arguing for replacing Miranda with videotaping).
10
See WELSH WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON
76-107 (2001) (summarizing these police tactics).
6
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questioning could occur, not how it could be done, opening the door to police tactics risking false
confessions or violations of human dignity.11 Those tactics, the commentators insisted, could not
be remedied by other constitutional provisions, for the only other ones relevant, the due process
clauses, were almost always automatically found met when Miranda was met as well.12
Whatever protection Miranda did provide, the Court has long been narrowing its scope,
finding it inapplicable in a wide range of contexts, its waiver easy, “minor” deviations from its
rule found unworthy of remedy, and suppression of fruits (such as physical evidence or
witnesses) discovered from its violation unlikely.13 Concerns about whether Miranda continued
to be seen by the Court as constitutionally-based were further fed by the Court’s repeated
assertions that Miranda was a mere judicially-created “prophylactic rule,” an “exclusionary
rule…[that] serves the Fifth Amendment…[but] sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment
itself.”14 To violate Miranda was thus not to violate true or “core” Fifth Amendment rights.15
Perhaps because of its lack of confidence that it could articulate a principled justification for
the Miranda rule, the post-Dickerson Court continued Miranda’s erosion. The Court still
described Miranda as a mere “prophylactic rule” entitled to less protection than the “core” Fifth
Amendment privilege16 - - a position hard to give any determinate meaning if, as Dickerson
concluded, Miranda is a constitutional rule like any other.

11

See id. at 118-59 (analyzing Miranda’s failures).
See id. at 122 (“[R]ecent decisions suggest that when the police comply with Miranda, it is, in fact, very difficult
for a defendant to establish that the confession following the Miranda waiver was involuntary). White argued
persuasively, however, that a more muscular interpretation of due process could do much good. See Andrew E.
Taslitz, Book Review, Miranda’s Waning Protections: Police Interrogation Practices after Dickerson, 17 CRIM.
JUST. 57 (2002) (analyzing this aspect of White’s approach).
13
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 716-55 (summarizing and analyzing the relevant case law on
these points).
14
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1985).
15
See, e.g., TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 745 (arguing for this reading of the Court’s recent case
law).
16
Thus, in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), the Court held that physical evidence obtained as a result of
a Miranda-violative unwarned confession was nevertheless admissible. Justice Thomas, writing for a three Justice
plurality, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, declared that the “core protection afforded by the
12
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Additionally the Court has held with force and clarity that physical fruits of Mirandaviolative confessions need not be suppressed;17 that confessions that are the fruits of earlier
unwarned ones may at best only sometimes be suppressed;18 and that Miranda violations not
resulting in criminal charges merit no civil damages awards because Miranda and the core Fifth
Amendment privilege are violated solely by the admission of an unwarned confession at trial
rather than by questioning made during the interrogation itself.19 The Court now faces further
pressure to cut back on Miranda in a political climate in which such constitutional rights are
viewed as unaffordable luxuries that may cost lives in the war on terrorism.20
B. The “Core” Privilege’s Non-Existent Foundations

Self-Incrimination Clause is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial.” Id.
at 642 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.). This core protection “cannot be violated by the introduction of
nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements.” Id. Moreover, “a mere failure to give
Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule” because
violations of the right and the rule take place only when unwarned statements are admitted at trial. Furthermore,
“because police cannot violate the Self-Incrimination Clause by taking unwarned though voluntary statements, an
exclusionary rule cannot be justified by reference to a deterrent effect on law enforcement” because there is nothing
to deter. Id. Although the remaining two justices who supported the Court’s judgment - - Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor - - urged narrower grounds for decision, pointedly choosing not to decide whether there was indeed
“nothing to deter,” they urged reliance on grounds similar to those in Elstad, thus implicitly accepting that latter
case’s distinction between “core” Fifth Amendment protections and “prophylactic” ones like Miranda. See Patane,
542 U.S. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17
See Patane, 542 U.S. 630.
18
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). There was no clear majority rationale in Seibert. Although the
Court ultimately suppressed a second properly Mirandized confession after the police first intentionally obtained an
earlier un-Mirandized confession, Justice Souter, writing for a four Justice plurality, articulated a multi-factor test
under which a “question first and warn later” interrogation tactic might be lawful in a particular case. See id. at 604,
606, 611-15 (Souter, J., plurality opinion). One member of the plurality, Justice Breyer, wrote separately to urge a
“good faith” of the police test. See id. at 617-18 (Breyer, J.). Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion provided the
fifth vote, suggesting something closer to per se exclusion of a confession that is the fruit of an intentional effort to
circumvent Miranda. See id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). All five Justices comprising a majority of votes for
the case’s outcome thus recognized that under certain circumstances a later confession that is the fruit of an earlier
unwarned one will not be suppressed. In a dissent written on behalf of herself and three other Justices, Justice
O’Connor again embraced Elstad, concluding, therefore, that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree rule never applies to
Miranda. Accordingly, the dissenters would never suppress a second confession that is the fruit of even an
intentionally Miranda-violative first confession. See id. at 622, 622-28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
19
See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
20
See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 183-216 (2007) (arguing for legalizing but regulating “coercive interrogation,” involving torture or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, as necessary in the war on terror).
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Yet the Court’s ever-reducing zeal for Miranda may be rooted not merely in doubts about
Miranda’s logic but also in doubts about the wisdom of the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination itself, upon which Miranda seemingly shakily rests.21 The Court’s attitude
arguably is that it is stuck with the privilege because it is, after all, in the Bill of Rights, but there
is no reason to magnify that regrettable error by giving the privilege an unduly broad meaning.22
Still less is there reason to keep vibrant a “prophylactic rule” like Miranda, a hole-riddled fence
meant to safeguard a decaying, archaic constitutional property.23 To be sure, the Court does
praise the privilege in grandiloquent but ultimately empty phrases, applauding its opposition to
the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt;24 its role in promoting a sense of
fair play, a fair individual-state balance,25 and an “accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of

21

See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 696-703 (discussing Miranda’s roots in the Fifth Amendment
privilege).
22
See id. at 716-55 (summarizing the Court’s frequently state-protective interpretation of Miranda), 801-48
(summarizing the Court’s frequently state-protective interpretation of the “core” Fifth Amendment privilege).
Justice Scalia, in a 1990 case, albeit then in dissent, may have captured the Court’s implicit reasons for its frequent
reluctance to give the privilege a backbone:
[I]t is wrong, and subtly corrosive of our criminal justice system, to regard an honest
confession as a mistake. While every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous for
the wrongdoer to admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves. Not only for
society, but for the wrongdoer himself, admission of guilt, if not coerced, is inherently
desirable because it advances the goals of both justice and rehabilitation….We should, then,
rejoice at the “poor fool” who has made [an honest confession]; and we should regret the
attempted retraction of that good act, rather than seek to facilitate and encourage it. To design
our laws on premises contrary to these is to abandon belief in either personal responsibility or
the moral claim of just government to obedience,
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that I have said that the Court
“frequently,” not always, sides with the state on privilege issues. There are important exceptions, most notably,
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27 (2000), which made it difficult for prosecutors seeking to subpoena records
from a suspect to do so without first granting him use and derivative sue immunity against the act of producing the
documents or their contents being used against him at trial. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and
Subpoenas for Incriminating Evidence: The Consequences and Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487
(2002) (analyzing thoroughly Hubbell’s implications for subpoena practice); Sara Sun Beale and James Felman, The
Fifth Amendment and the Grand Jury, 22 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5-6 5-6 (2007) (analyzing implications of Hubbell and its
progeny).
23
See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
24
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
25
Id.
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criminal justice”;26 and its protection of the innocent and “respect for the human personality and
of the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life….”27 These
noble-sounding phrases appear less often in the Court’s most recent privilege jurisprudence.28
1. Hiibel’s Halted Hopes
Indeed, the Court has in several recent instances given the core privilege short shrift
in the face of sometimes minimally countervailing state need. For example, in Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial District Court of Nevada,29 an officer responding to a tip asked a man on the scene for
identification. After the officer eleven times requested that man, later identified as Larry Dudley
Hiibel, to identify himself, the officer threatened to arrest Hiibel if he still refused to answer.
When Hiibel did so refuse, the officer arrested him for obstructing a public officer’s discharge of
his duties. The officer relied on a statute requiring persons detained by an officer on reasonable
suspicion of crime to identify themselves. The Court affirmed Hiibel’s later conviction,
describing the required revelation of his name as “so insignificant in the scheme of things as to
be incriminating only in unusual circumstances”30 and deriding Hiibel’s refusal to answer as
done simply “because he thought his name was none of the officer’s business.”31
Justice Stevens dissented. First, he concluded that Hiibel’s revelation of his name was
“testimonial,” for a “testimonial communication” is “the extortion of information from the

26

Id.
Id.
28
See Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted, 24 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 246 (2004) (“Although discussion of abstract values can still be found occasionally
in its opinions, the Supreme Court has shifted to a formal approach to the Fifth Amendment.”); Lance Cole, The
Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Documents After United States v. Hubbell - - New Protection for
Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 142-43 (2002) (concluding that, in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
396-97 (1976), the Court “rejected both property rights and personal privacy as rationales for protection against selfincrimination; instead, it looked to the text of the Fifth Amendment and focused on the compulsion of ‘testimonial’
communications as the touchstone for self-incrimination analysis.”).
29
542 U .S. 177 (2004).
30
Id. at 191.
31
Id.
27
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accused, the attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind.’”32 The direct
questioning by the officer pursuant to threats of arrest, argued Stevens, was also compulsion.33
Nor would Justice Stevens accept the majority’s core argument that Hiibel’s compelled
disclosure of his name would not have been “incriminating,” for, in Stevens’ view, one’s name
can readily provide the necessary link to inculpatory evidence:
The Court reasons that we should not assume that the disclosure of
petitioner’s name would be used to incriminate him or that it would furnish a
link in a chain of evidence needed to prosecute him….But why else would an
officer ask for it? And why else would the Nevada Legislature require its
disclosure only when circumstances “reasonably indicate that the person has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime?” If the Court is
correct, then petitioner’s refusal to cooperate did not impede the police
investigation. Indeed, if we accept the predicate for the Court’s holding, the
statute requires nothing more than a useless invasion of privacy. I think that,
on the contrary, the Nevada Legislature intended to provide its police officers
with a useful law enforcement tool, and that the very existence of the statute
demonstrates the value of the information it demands….
A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the
person, particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of
law enforcement databases. And that information, in turn, can be
tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution. It is therefore quite wrong to
suggest that a person’s identity provides a link in the chain to incriminating
evidence “only in unusual circumstances.”34
Remember that Hiibel had been stopped because the officer claimed, based upon a tip, to
have “reasonable suspicion” that Hiibel was involved in a crime. Under Terry v. Ohio,35 the
Fourth Amendment permits such reasonable suspicion stops, so long as they are brief, relatively
unintrusive, and involve an effort to question a suspect to confirm or dispel the officer’s
suspicion, questions that Justice White, in his Terry concurrence, importantly said, the suspect

32

Id. at 191, 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988)).
See id. at 194-95.
34
Id. at 195-96.
35
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33
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was “not obliged to answer….”36 Justice Breyer,37 joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg in
dissent in Hiibel, insisted that this final quoted language from White’s concurrence in Terry was
part of what made a brief stop so unintrusive that it would be justified on mere reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause. Indeed, in Breyer’s view, this understanding of Terry was
longstanding, having been restated in Berkemer v. McCarty,38 where the full Court declared that
“an officer may ask the [Terry] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the
detainee is not obliged to respond.”39 Even more recently, noted Breyer, the Court in Illinois v.
Wardlow40 had explained that allowing officers to stop and question a fleeing person is “quite
consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in
the face of police questioning.”41 The majority’s cavalier denial of Fifth Amendment protections
to Hiibel, therefore, argued Breyer, had grave Fourth Amendment implications, constituting a
sub silentio overruling of Terry to permit far more invasive police investigatory actions:
There is no good reason to reject this generation-old statement of the law.
There are sound reasons rooted in Fifth Amendment considerations for
adhering to the Fourth Amendment legal condition circumscribing police
authority to stop an individual against his will….Administrative
considerations also militate against change. Can a state, in addition to
requiring a stopped individual to answer “What’s your name?” also require an
answer to “What’s your license number?” or “Where do you live?” Can a
police officer, who must know how to make a Terry stop, keep track of the
constitutional answers? After all, answers to any of these questions may, or
may not, incriminate, depending upon the circumstances.
Indeed, as the majority points out, a name itself—even if it is not “Killer
Bill” or “Rough ‘em up Harry”—will sometimes provide the police with a
“link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate
36

Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
542 U.S. at 197, 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
39
Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
40
528 U.S. 119 (2000).
41
Id. at 125.
37
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offense.”…The majority reserves judgment about whether compulsion is
permissible in such instances…. How then is a police officer in the midst of a
Terry stop to distinguish between the majority’s ordinary case and this special
case where the majority reserves judgment?42
More was, therefore, at stake in Hiibel than might at first blush seem to be involved in the
simple request for a name. Indeed, some commentators have worried that Hiibel opens the door
to a mandatory national electronic identification card containing an array of identifying
information that would have to be produced for the police upon demand.43
2. Lile’s Difficult Choice
42

542 U.S. at 199 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a detailed analysis of Hiibel’s erosion of Terry, see E. Martin
Estrada, Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of the Terry Doctrine, 40 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. (2005).
43
See, e.g., Arnold Loewy, The Cowboy and the Cop: The Saga of Dudley Hiibel, 9/11, and the Vanishing Fourth
Amendment, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 929, 939, 941 (2005) (expressing the fear that Hiibel portends mandatory
national identity cards readily to be produced for police inspection upon request); M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called
Hiibel: The Criminalization of Silence, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 357, 393 (2004) (expressing similar concerns);
TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 342-43 (querying how much identifying information might be
permissible on a national identity card in light of Hiibel). It is worth noting that Dudley Hiibel had in fact
committed no crime other than his refusal to identify himself to the officer; that the officer refused to respond to
Hiibel’s inquiries about why the officer wanted Hiibel’s name and identification papers; and that the officers, who
were supposedly investigating a report of a woman being beaten, ended up throwing the only woman present,
Hiibel’s daughter, Mimi, to the ground when she protested, then arresting her. See Loewy, supra, at 930-36, 943-45.
Here is what Hiibel himself had to say about the Supreme Court’s decision in his case:
I don’t have a super-clear understanding of the Constitution. I’m not an attorney. I’ve never
even read the whole thing. I only went through eighth grade. But I remember what I learned,
and it seems to me that the whole idea of “your-papers-please” goes completely against the
grain of the American people.
As I understood it, the state was supposed to serve us - - not that we were supposed to serve
the state. Laws were supposed to protect the people against the government, not the other
way around.
Maybe in Los Angeles and other places across the country, the police have browbeaten the
people into more acceptance of this police state mentality than where I am. I live out on a
ranch, the nearest town is 30 miles away, and it only has 7,000 or 8,000 people. I think that
has an effect on our mentality.
It’s not that I’m anti-law enforcement. Criminals should be apprehended. But I don’t think
we’ve got to take everybody’s rights away just so that we can be safe. If you do that, you’ve
defeated your purpose. I don’t think people want to be protected to the extent that they
become slaves.
I’m very disappointed by this decision. I think a basic freedom has been lost. What bothers
me the most is that my children and grandchildren are going to have to live with this law. It
moves us a step closer to control of the people by the government, and I don’t think that’s a
step forward.
See id. at 945.

9

McKune v. Lile44 offers a second illustration of the Court’s often grudging attitude
toward the privilege. There, prison officials, several years before convicted sex offender Robert
Lile was scheduled to be released, ordered him to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment
Program (SATP). The program required participating inmates to sign a form discussing and
accepting responsibility for the crime for which they were sentenced and to complete a sexual
history that was to extend even to activities constituting uncharged criminal offenses. These
forms had to be signed and completed without either contractual or court-ordered immunity from
prosecution. Prison officials told Lile that if he refused to participate, his privileged status would
be reduced, curtailing his visitation rights, earnings, and work opportunities, and he would be
transferred from a two-person to a four-person cell and in a likely more dangerous maximum
security unit. He refused to participate, citing the privilege, and brought suit for injunctive relief.
When the case ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court, it reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in Lile’s favor. The Court plurality, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that the
program was not an elaborate ruse to circumvent the privilege, nor was compulsion even present.
In reaching its conclusion, the plurality stressed the “serious threat” sexual offenders posed to
the nation, their high recidivisim rate, their need for clinical rehabilitative programs to manage
their impulses, and the importance to program success of their accepting responsibility for all
their actions. On the other side, the plurality characterized the threatened penalties Lile would
face for not confessing his sins as not “atypical and significant hardships,” a test the plurality
borrowed from its due process jurisprudence.45 Incarceration “necessarily place[s] limitations on

44
45

536 U.S. 24 (2002).
Id. at 37.
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the exercise of a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.46 Lost work and television
opportunities were small prices to pay given that “rehabilitation is a legitimate penological
interest that must be weighed against the exercise of an inmate’s liberty.”47 Because acceptance
of responsibility via this program bore a “rational relation” to a legitimate rehabilitative
objective,48 indeed served an important social purpose, said the plurality, it “would be bitter
medicine to treat as irrelevant the State’s legitimate interests and to invalidate the SATP on the
ground that it incidentally burdens an inmate’s right to remain silent.”49 Given the “de minimis”
harms to Lile, the threatened penalties did not “rise to the level of unconstitutional
compulsion.”50
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, rejecting the “atypical hardship” test for a more
commonsense test “whether the pressure imposed in such [a] situation rises to a level where it is
likely to compel a person to be a witness against himself.”51 But, even under her alternative test,
Justice O’Connor agreed with the plurality that Lile’s threatened loss of privileges and transfer to
maximum security did not constitute compulsion.
Interestingly, the Court made little fuss about the cost to Lile of facing additional criminal
prosecutions based on supposedly therapeutic incriminating statements. Justice Stevens
dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, partly because of this point. Not only
did the majority undervalue this risk, but it also ignored the “dignitary and reputational” harms
from the threatened transfer, the stigma of a punishment equal to that provided for the most
serious offenses against prison rules (theft, drug abuse, and assault), the deprivation of privileges

46

Id. at 38.
Id. at 36.
48
Id. at 37-38.
49
Id. at 41-42.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 48, 49 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
47
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earned by years of good behavior, and the unreality of ignoring downward changes in baseline
prison conditions as likely being experienced by Lile as forms of serious punishment.52 Said
Stevens,
Based on an ad hoc appraisal of the benefits of obtaining confessions from sex
offenders, balanced against the costs of honoring a bedrock constitutional
right, the plurality holds that it is permissible to punish the assertion of the
privilege with what it views as modest sanctions, provided that those sanctions
are not given a “punitive” label. As I shall explain, the sanctions are in fact
severe, but even if that were not so, the plurality’s policy judgment does not
justify the evisceration of a constitutional right. Despite the plurality’s
meandering attempt to justify its unprecedented departure from a rule of law
that has been settled since the days of John Marshall, I respectfully dissent.53
Stevens further chided the majority for using the wrong rod to measure compulsion. “The
coerciveness of the penalty in this case,” insisted Stevens, “must be measured not by comparing
the quality of life in a prison environment with that in a free society, but rather by the contrast
between the favored and disfavored classes of prisoners.”54 None of the Court’s prior opinions,
Stevens concluded, “contains any suggestion that compulsion should have a different meaning in
the prison context.”55
It is not my purpose here to attack or defend the holdings in Hiibel and McKune nor indeed in
any other of the Court’s Fifth Amendment privilege cases. Rather, Hiibel and McKune illustrate
the Court’s ready willingness implicitly or explicitly to engage in a balancing of state against
individual interests in giving the privilege meaning. I have no quarrel with balancing, indeed
seeing it as unavoidable in the context of the privilege. Where I do have a quarrel with the Court,
including with the dissenters in Hiibel and McKune, is the Justice’s failure to articulate with any
specificity exactly what values the privilege serves. Vague, high-sounding praise for a checklist

52

Id. at 54, 60-68 (Steven, J., dissenting).
Id. at 54-55.
54
Id. at 67.
55
Id. at 58.
53
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of disparate but ambiguous justifications for the privilege give lower courts and the police little
guidance for future cases and leave even the Justices no common ground on which to contend
with difficult or novel issues. Still worse, absent a convincing justification for the privilege, the
individual may too readily lose in the weighing process, leading to the privilege’s slow erosion.
Alternatively, even where the individual deserves to lose, the absence of a persuasive
justification is inconsistent with procedural justice.56
C. An Alternative to the Scholarly Assault on the Privilege
The Court’s failures adequately to justify the privilege occur in an intellectual climate in
which many commentators’ biting critiques of any proffered justifications for the “right to
silence” are widely seen as persuasive.57 Sophisticated philosophical efforts to shore up the
56

Procedural justice, provision of which can increase obedience to the law, includes receiving an understandable
explanation for the government’s action that even the loser in the courtroom can accept as legitimate. See, e.g., TOM
R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE
COURTS 80 (2002) (noting that procedural justice is enhanced when authorities are perceived as being candid and
complete in explaining their reasons for action).
57
See infra text accompanying notes 59-60. This observation does not mean, however, that there are not wellrespected supporters of the philosophical foundations for the right to silence. There are. See, e.g., SUSAN EASTON,
THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 133-97 (2d ed. 1998) (responding to arguments that the privilege against
self-incrimination primarily protects the guilty and undermines the truth-finding functions of a trial); Sheri LynnJohnson, Confessions, Criminals, and Community, 26 HARV. CIV. RTS. – CIV. LIB. L. REV. 327 (1991) (defending
the privilege as one among several “voluntariness rights” that prevent sacrificing the individual in the name of
community); R. Kent Greenawalt, The Right to Silence and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 192 (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent ed.s 1992) (justifying the
privilege as protecting human dignity, defined as the absence of humiliating treatment). But each of these supporters
offers some variant on a variety of standard justifications for that privilege that Akhil Amar, among other leading
critics, has systematically assailed. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 65-70
(1997). Here is a quick summary of Amar’s critiques:
1. Compelled Self-Accusation is Cruel: Nonsense, says Amar, because we routinely and
necessarily compel such accusation where it has sometimes devastating civil consequences.
Id. at 65.
2. The Privilege Protects Mental Privacy: Wrong again, says Amar, because we routinely
require witness-revelation of embarrassing, even humiliating, information in civil cases, like
divorce, involving high emotional intensity. Id. at 65-66.
3. Government Disrespects a Person by Using Him as an Instrument of His Own
Destruction: No it doesn’t, insists Amar, because “generally, the law is entitled to every
person’s evidence,” no matter how harmful to him, so long as he does not thereby face
criminal prosecution. Id. at 66-67.
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privilege’s intellectual foundations — including on grounds other than those articulated by the
Court - - are reflexively-derided by many leading authorities as well-meaning but misguided.58
Thus Harvard criminal procedure theorist William Stuntz has explained, “It is probably fair to
say that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the privilege against selfincrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any rational theory.”59 Well-known
4. The Privilege Furthers a “Fair Balance” Between the State and Individuals and
Expresses a Preference for an “Accusatorial Over an Inquisitorial System”: “These phrases,
however, are more like slogans that simply restate the rule than carefully considered
rationales.” Id. at 67. They devolve into just making the game interesting by handicapping
the state and do not explain why it is perfectly acceptable to compel a suspect to produce
physical evidence. Amar offers a similar response to the argument that the privilege forces the
government to “shoulder its entire burden of proof.” Id. at 67.
5. The Privilege Helps to Deter Improper Police Practices: Not so, says Amar, for those
practices remain rampant.
6. The Privilege Protects the Innocent: No, it does not, Amar points out, because it prevents
the innocent from compelling the guilty to testify. Id. at 68.
7. The Privilege Promotes Reliable Evidence: A good goal, agrees Amar, but not one he
sees the current version of the privilege protecting well, partly because it is sometimes applied
to exclude quite reliable evidence. Id. at 68.
In summary, concludes Amar:
None of the rationales typically given for the self-incrimination clause can satisfactorily
explain the current scope of the privilege and its relation to the rest of our legal and moral
system. Sometimes, the idea behind the given rationale is simply wrongheaded. At other
times, the animating idea is valuable but proves too much or too little (or both) and thus
cannot explain why the clause goes as far as it now does but no further.
Id. at 65.
The best-known comprehensive critique of the varied proffered justifications for the privilege is David Dolinko, Is
There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063 (1986). More recent
efforts to supplement the Court’s stated justifications for the privilege have been described by two leading
commentators as “a proliferation of scholarly emendations to the Court’s explanations that uniformly fail to
convince.” Allen & Mace, supra note 28, at 245. See also Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the
Criminal Justice System, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1015-23 (1996) (cataloguing reasons for the
unconvincing nature of these efforts).
59
William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988). These critiques of the
justifications for the privilege extend to both the defenses offered by scholars and by the Court. See Allen & Mac,
supra note 28, at 244 (describing the “fundamental values” that the Court lists as protected by the privilege as
“striking in their vacuity and circularity”), 245 (assailing scholarly defenses of the privilege). Even seeming friends
of the privilege have found much of its scope troubling and many of its defenses inconsistent. See, e.g., Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 311, 311 (1991)
(“The Self-Incrimination Clause is probably our most schizophrenic amendment.”). Important critiques of the
privilege and its justifications were made by leading figures in the mid-twentieth century, see Henry J. Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968), and go at least as
far back as Jeremy Bentham. See EASTON, supra note 57, at 163-97.
58
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constitutional scholar Akhil Amar similarly concludes thus: “Small wonder, then, that the selfincrimination clause - - virtually alone among the provisions of the Bill of Rights - - has been the
target of repeated analytic assault over the course of the twentieth century from thoughtful
commentators urging constitutional amendments to narrow it or repeal it altogether.”60
In this article, I have no intention of taking on the daunting task of responding to each, or
even any, of the critiques of the privilege or the cheers of its defenders. Instead, I plan to recite a
theory of my own. My “new” defense does draw on elements of some older ones61 but places

60

AMAR, supra note 57, at 68. Amar claims to be a friend of the privilege, offering what he sees as the first
persuasive justification for it: to protect against the compulsion of the spoken word by a witness at a criminal trial.
Id. at 46-47, 70-71. But this justification would, as Amar happily admits, allow the government to compel testimony
in “grand jury rooms, legislative hearings, civil cases, criminal cases in which someone is on trial, and depositions
organized by prosecutors,” even depositions of the criminal defendant himself, albeit then under the supervision of a
presiding judge. Id. at 70. Furthermore, although Amar would bar introduction of compelled pre-trial testimony at
the speaker’s own criminal trial absent his knowing and intelligent consent, Amar would readily allow into evidence
the fruits of compulsion, including physical evidence and documents stemming from compulsion, such as by a
subpoena. See id. at 70-71, 76, 84. Moreover, the overriding justification for Amar’s approach is this: “The selfincrimination clause, as best read, is designed to protect a truly innocent defendant who might be made to look
guilty on the stand by a clever prosecutor skilled in technical courtroom procedure and forensics.” Id. at 74.
Whatever the wisdom of Amar’s proposal as a matter of policy or even of constitutional interpretation, it is hardly a
defense of anything that looks remotely like the current privilege.
61
For example, I ground my argument in part in a theory of “mental privacy,” albeit one tightly linked to the role of
language in human social interaction, an approach different from that of other writers. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text (summarizing others’ privacy theories). My idea of the role of compulsion under the privilege
resonates with the work of other authors embracing protection of human dignity by avoiding state-imposed
humiliation as a justification for the privilege, see Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 193-98, but, unlike those authors,
my concern with humiliation is linked tightly to the importance of words in self-definition. See infra text
accompanying notes 62-77 (summarizing the major components of my theory of the privilege). Amar too focuses
on words but emphasizes their cognitive, rather than their social, component, embracing the truth-promoting
function of the privilege and radically constricting its coverage in ways I do not. See supra note 58 (summarizing
Amar’s argument). Allen and Mace deny that they are “justifying” the privilege at all, claiming they are merely
describing theory inherent in the doctrine, a theory that, though quite different from Amar’s, again stresses
narrowly-defined cognitive processes over social, linguistic ones. See Allen & Mac, supra note 28, at 247-48.
Louis Michael Seidman, in a brilliant forthcoming book, praises the right to silence as essential to human expressive
freedom. “A defiant silence,” his book cover explains, “demonstrates determination, courage, and will,” as when
draft resisters refuse to take a military oath, their silence serving as a “manifestation of connection, commitment,
and meaning.” See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM (forthcoming 2007). Seidman also sees the
privilege as “preserving the distinction between mind and body on which human freedom depends.” Id. Seidman’s
emphases on political expression, individual identity, and social isolation versus social solidarity hit chords
harmonious with my own ideas about voice and privacy. But Seidman does not root his analysis in the social science
concerning language use, social stigma, and the nature of the human personality, as I do, nor does my theory turn so
much on the separation of body and mind as their linkage; the physical acts of speaking and writing, I argue, help to
constitute and alter the more intangible parts of our nature. Finally, Janet Ainsworth has explored the impact of
“powerless language,” but she limited her exploration to the narrow context of the interrogation room; did not place
her analysis into a broader theory of privacy; did not focus on the many other linguistic forces at work beyond the
powerlessness dynamic; and did not explore the nature and role of linguistic compulsion as central to the very
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them into a broader overriding theme, adds never-before articulated aspects, and examines
inadequately-explored implications. My hope is to start a dialogue that will either foster my
embryonic theory’s growth toward adulthood or quickly kill it as a monstrosity that I could not
initially see.
1. The Literal Voice
Concisely (and perhaps therefore misleadingly) stated, my theory is this: the privilege
against self-incrimination serves to protect the literal and metaphorical voice of those ensnared in
the criminal process. By “literal voice,” I mean the physical qualities of the human voice - -its
pitch, tone, rate, and timbre - - and the content of its aural message, the precise words chosen and
their likely perceived meaning.62 The literal voice plays important social functions in addition to
conveying denotative information, including enabling social judgments to be made about a
speaker’s moral culpability and social status, his credibility, and his inclusion or exclusion from
full membership in society. Audience reactions to the literal voice also help to reinforce social
norms, igniting pressures to move social dissenters toward complying with, and indeed
emotionally embracing, those norms. These social processes mean that the mere expression of
the literal voice may subject a speaker to intense social stigma, to moral assessments of his
character and culpability based upon distorted or incomplete information, and to
misunderstandings of his intended message, even when, for example, in the interrogation
context, he truthfully confesses his guilt.63 These forces can prove still more disturbing, of
course, for the innocent speaker.

definition of the privilege. See Janet Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L. J. 259 (1992).
62
See infra Part III.
63
See id.
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But it is not only protection from having one’s words used by others to mis-define64 the
speaker’s essential nature that the privilege protects, for the compulsion of such words itself
forces the speaker to change his very nature without his choosing. The speaking of words has the
power to shape thoughts, feelings, and character, as recent cognitive science research reveals.
Such compulsion is deeply and uniquely humiliating in ways not previously recognized.65
The criminal justice system is appropriately designed in part to provide the ultimate state
expression of social norms and social stigma, rendering confessions in that context sui generis.66
The right “to silence” and its corollaries enable a suspect, or even a witness, to minimize the ill
social effects of compelled speaking in that context, including minimizing distortion of the
speaker’s message - - costs that he would otherwise bear to some degree even if he is ultimately
neither convicted nor even prosecuted.67
In sum, one powerful justification for the privilege, therefore, is this: it guards against the
compelled articulation of words that raise a risk of both undue state intervention in the very
64

Professor Lawrence Lessig describes a privacy theory focusing on mis-definition as solving a portion of the
problem of limited attention span. See Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L. J. 2063 (2001). In
other words, the problem is that observers will not take the time fully to gather all the available information about a
person and process it thoroughly so as to correctly understand it. See id. at 2064-72. But Lessig’s description is an
incomplete one, at least of the mis-definition theory offered in this article, First, the privacy theory argued for here
turns on the importance of having control over self-revelation. To lose such control is to lose command over
choosing just what sort of person you are or wish to be, for, as Part IV of this article will explain, compelled selfrevelation in fact changes your fundamental nature in ways you might not prefer, a grievous moral injury. Second,
control matters because you may not want to reveal all of yourself to all others in all contexts, and they may not
want you to do so. What you do care about is revealing those aspects of your character in a particular setting in such
a way so that those aspects will be fully understood. Thus, on the job, you might want to reveal information about
your punctuality and self-discipline but not your love life. Indeed, fuller revelation of more aspects of your self is a
mark of intimacy, both identifying and helping to create close personal relationships. If you lose control over selfrevelation, therefore, you lose control over your intimate life. Third, it is impossible to reveal sufficient information
about yourself to most individuals to enable them to judge your entire nature fairly, even if they bothered to pay
adequate attention, for full self-revelation takes years and is a continuing process as we ourselves change over time.
If we lose control over self-revelation, therefore, we necessarily risk mis-definition of our overall being. Fourth, the
act of being described itself changes our nature, so we may prefer to avoid self-revelation even if others’
assessments of us are accurate. Last, the self-revelation theory here is concerned with the importance of words in a
way that neither Lessig nor others has addressed. The theory here thus incorporates, but is about more than, attention
span.
65
See infra Part IV.
66
See infra text accompanying notes 212-41.
67
Id.
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creation of the speaker’s essential nature and the resulting extreme social stigma and social misdefinition of personality that result from the prospect of being judged by the criminal Justice
system. Rephrased, the privilege protects against the compelled articulation of the literal voice
in, or for use at, a criminal trial. Furthermore, although the spoken voice is the paradigm case,
similar values are involved in protecting the compelled written word.68 This theory’s emphasis
on feared social stigma at self-revelation does put it in the privacy camp of defenses of the
privilege. However, it differs from other privacy theories by focusing on compelled words,
language as not only opening a door to one’s head and heart but as helping to construct them
both.69 Furthermore, unlike other privacy theories, it emphasizes the unique danger of private
thoughts and feelings being exposed to a particular audience: the criminal justice system.70
Moreover, this theory emphasizes the cognitive, emotional, and societal harms stemming from
compelled linguistic self-revelation. Unlike other privacy theories, therefore, mine does not
suffer from the problem of overbreadth - - of explaining too much.71 Other constitutional
provisions protect other aspects of privacy, and many sometimes overlap with the Fifth
Amendment’s protection.72 But only the Fifth Amendment privilege guards against the specific
sort of privacy invasion involved in compelled language. Moreover, because under this theory
the full-scale harms of language compulsion occur whenever the compulsion takes place with the
prospect of criminal justice involvement, the privilege retains its broad scope as operating both
before and during the criminal trial.73
2. The Metaphorical Voice
68

See infra text accompany notes 403-63.
See supra note 61 (describing others’ privacy theories).
70
See id.
71
See id.
72
See infra text accompany notes 466-69.
73
See supra note 60 (describing Amar’s theory, which, by contrast, limits the role of the privilege to the criminal
trial of the defendant seeking to assert the privilege).
69
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Note, however, that I have said that defense of the literal voice is one purpose of the
privilege, and my focus in this article will solely be on that subject. But a fuller defense of the
privilege also requires exploring the importance of protecting the metaphorical voice. The
metaphorical voice is the expression of social information by a speaker’s words to a political
body, such as a judge or jury, carrying data relevant to the development of political norms and
processes, even though conveying such data may not have been the speaker’s intention.74 That
voice, it turns out, requires the presence of counsel. Without a right to counsel, the privilege is
nearly useless, for an accused who chooses to remain silent has no voice with which to defend
himself. He must speak or simply put himself at the court’s mercy.75 Moreover, the political
message that he conveys can only be effectively presented with the aid of counsel or by
counsel’s speaking in the defendant’s stead, that is, as if it were the defendant himself
speaking.76 The political nature of even a run-of-the mill trial and the political role of trial
counsel are not self-evident. Without understanding them, therefore, my defense of the
privilege, both in its “core” form and as it manifests itself in Miranda, is incomplete. Explaining
the role of the literal voice is the only task I seek to complete here.
One final caveat. My goal here is to offer a sound justification for the privilege. I am not
arguing that my defense of the privilege is in some sense dictated by the constitutional text or its
history. Nor will I have much to say about specific doctrinal puzzles. But offering a
philosophical defense can be a first step in constitutional interpretation and can overcome the

74

See Andrew E. Taslitz, Miranda and Metaphor: The Role of Counsel in the Privilege against Self-Incrimination
(unpublished draft manuscript 2007) [hereinafter Miranda and Metaphor].
75
See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1449, 1477-79
(2005) (making similar point).
76
See Taslitz, Miranda and Metaphor, supra note 74.
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institutional ennui that stems from wrongly viewing the privilege as an unfortunate relic of a
more primitive age.77
After this Part I Introduction, Part II of this article briefly summarizes the sort of “mental
privacy” that the privilege protects. Part II also explores a two-stage theory of privacy harm and
the unique role of the criminal justice system. Part III analyzes the social science literature on
the impact of the literal voice on a speaker’s audience, next extending that argument to
handwriting, typing, e-mail, blogs, and chat rooms. Part IV completes the model by examining
the harms done to the human personality from compelled speech. Finally, Part V, the
conclusion, sums up the preceding arguments and briefly explores some potential implications.
II. Mental Privacy
A. Privacy and Mindreading
In common sense terms, “mental privacy” means having control over when, how, and to
whom each of us reveals our thoughts and feelings in our own words.78 Two key aspects of this
definition are that we retain control over the revelation decision and that the revelation is
conveyed by our own words.79 Other people are constantly trying, and frequently succeeding, in
77

SOTORIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79-116
(2007) (explaining why even originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation ultimately require resolving a
number of philosophical questions).
78

Thomas Carlyle put the point this way:

A man always is to be himself the judge how much of his mind he will show to other men,
even to those he would have work along with him. There are impertinent inquires made: your
rule is, to leave the inquirer uninformed on that matter, not, if you can help it, misinformed;
but precisely as dark as he was!
THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY (1841) (quoted in LEONARD ROY
FRANK, QUOTIONARY 742 (2001)).
79
See, e.g., ROY F. BAUMEISTER, THE CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE 35-38,
93-102, 138-41 (2005) (summarizing research demonstrating that the quest for control over our environment,
including our social environment, is a basic human need and that our power ever language use is our central means
for exercising social control); BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR: FOLK EXPLANATIONS,
MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 68-71 (2004) (explaining that the human drive for meaning requires using
language to construct private, internal explanations of your own and others’ actions and public, communicative
explanations to manage social impressions); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG, & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
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gaining access to our minds and hearts by reading our facial expressions, body language, and
tone of voice.80 They do so in light of social conventions and of any particularized information
about us that they have obtained from other sources.81 These efforts to read our minds against
our will may be resented, yet they do not violate mental privacy as I have defined it here because
we are not compelled to condemn ourselves in our own words.82 Indeed, it would be impossible
to stop such efforts at mindreading, for it is an evolutionarily-developed skill necessary to all
human social interaction,83 as I will illustrate shortly.
Successful mindreading enables us to build or fend off close personal relationships, to
modify our own behavior in personally beneficial ways, and to predict or influence the behavior

PRIVACY, INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY 38 (2006) (noting that “[a] number of theorists…conceive of privacy as
a form of control over personal information,” a broader definition than the linguistic mental privacy, involving
control over language use, that I defend here as central to understanding the right to silence).
80
See BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 6 (defining mindreading, also known as theory of mind, as the ability to
“anticipate the thought processes and emotional processes of others,” making us simultaneously “more sensitive to
what others might be thinking about us,” matters “vital to enable us to participate in complex social
interactions….”); MALLE, supra note 79, at 70-71, 155-65 (noting and illustrating primacy of language in
impression management); Paul EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING FACES AND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE
COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL LIFE 219-20 (2003) (explaining that, while persons vary in their ability
accurately to read emotions from voice and face, most people can do so, at least if the expressions are intense and
the person observed is not trying to hide the emotion).
81

Explains MALLE:

Knowledge, however, is not the only cognitive resource available. If an explainer does
not actually know the agent’s reasons, he may still infer or construct them. Indications in the
agent’s mannerisms or past behavior, clues from the action context, and general cultural
expectations about the kinds of motives that underlie certain behaviors usually provide a
sufficient basis for inducing a reason.
MALLE, supra note 79, at 123. Malle is defining “reasons” in a technical sense as only one sort of explanation we
construct for human action, but elaborating here on those details would do little to add or subtract from my point.
82
Yet that resentment can sometimes be quite powerful. Says Jean Rolin, “The pretension of man to explore the
conscience of others, the forcible rape of secrecy, are a diabolical parody of the all-seeingness of God.” FRANK,
supra note 78, at 743 (quoting JEAN ROLIN, POLICE DRUGS 7.2 (transl. Laurence J. Bendit 1956)).
83
See, e.g., BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 209 (“If you are going to be competent to participate in human culture,
you have to be able to think in terms of social causes.”); DAVID LIVINGSTON SMITH, WHY WE LIE: THE
EVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF DECEPTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND (2004) (describing the “evolutionary arms
race” between detection and deception, that is, between being able to read minds versus blinding others to your
own); ERIC HOFFER, REFLECTIONS ON THE HUMAN CONDITION 142 (1973) (“There are no chaste minds. Minds
copulate wherever they meet.”).
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of others.84 This tool is, of course, an imperfect one, because evolution has also developed
deceptive strategies designed to shield our true hearts from others.85 Individuals vary in their
skill at performing deception, and its use varies with context.86 Moreover, the person whom we
seek to read may not know his own mind.87 Self-deception runs rampant through the human
community.88 Nevertheless, imperfect though it may be, mindreading efforts are central to the
human condition,89 and each of us knows and expects at some level that we are constantly being

84

See BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 92-93, 97-97 (explaining that understanding of others and self furthers the
human quest for control over the social sphere by enabling you to predict what others will do, influence them, build
or alter relationships with them, and change yourself to fit the social environment); MALLE, supra note 79, at 71
(your private explanations of your own and others’ actions help to satisfy your own curiosity, allay confusion, and
predict or manipulate social reality, while your publicly-stated explanations of your own actions satisfy others’
curiosity, lessen their confusion, manage their impressions, manipulate their behavior, combat disagreements, and
coordinate joint plans or actions).
85

See SMITH, supra note 83, at 65-71. Self-deception about our real motivations is one critical tool for hiding them
from others:
Why did self-deception take root in the human mind? As we will see, the propensity for selfdeception probably became part of our nature because it was so helpful to us in our dealings
with one another. Not only does lying to oneself soothe many of the stresses of life, but, more
importantly, it also helps one lie to others. One of the most important insights of modern
sociobiology is that self-deception is the handmaiden of deceit: in hiding the truth from
ourselves, we are able to hide it more fully from others.
Id. at 3.
86
See id. at 104-11 (noting that it is hard for many people to lie effectively, to remain straight-faced while playing
“social poker”).
87
See SMITH, supra note 83, at 50-78, 106-11 (explaining the evolutionary forces promoting widespread selfdeception among the human species).
88
See id.: STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 42-75 (analyzing
cognitive strategies involved in self-deception); see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape
and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 381 (2005) (summarizing in detail the cognitive and evolutionary
psychology literature on self-deception).
89

See supra text accompanying notes 78-83. Cognitive and evolutionary psychologist David Livingstone Smith put
this point well:

The effective deceiver must be able to track others’ responses on a moment-to-moment basis,
adjusting his or her tactics based on a steady stream of perceptual feedback. An artful,
wheeling-dealing species must have a knack for predicting, controlling, and understanding
behavior. In order to do so, it must have an intuitive grasp of how to infer others’ mental
states and how these mental states work together to produce behavior. For this reason, we
spend a good deal of our time trying to figure out the mental states of others - - their beliefs,
desires, goals, and fears - - so as to manipulate their behavior in ways that serve our own
interests.
Id. at 105-06. Smith continues: “A savvy social operator needs to have an excellent grasp of human self-interests,
because it’s impossible to beguile others unless you understand what makes them tick.” Id.
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so scrutinized and are doing the same to others.90 What we can usually protect are the words in
our hearts and minds or that we use to describe what else resides there.91 Words too can
deceive,92 but humans give them especially powerful weight as a window into another’s soul.93
Some windows are seen as clear, others purposely smudged and thus requiring a more careful
look and a bit of clearing away the dirt obscuring what lies beneath.94 Yet they are both
windows just the same.
Not all thoughts and feelings, of course, consist of words. Yet the only way each of us has to
understand or convey the wordless feeling or fledgling thought is in words.95 Most thought is
indeed subconscious,96 yet when we can bring such thoughts to the conscious surface, or at least
when we believe we can do so, it is only by words that these thoughts become accessible.97
90

See BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 6 (“The ability to see ourselves as others see us, and to care about what they
think, is a crucial part of what makes us human - - and it is also utterly unavoidable, indispensable, if you are going
to live in culture”).
91

Although it sometimes seems that several mental speakers are competing for our attention, we
each know that the “voices” in our heads - - the various questioners and answerers who
participate in our inner conversations - - are actually part of us. Despite the sense that there
are different voices in your head, you know that the decision that you ultimately make
whether to go on a cruise or to have tea or to take the job in Seattle is your decision. You
don’t have the sense that one of the voices in your head has somehow won the day and that
the others have unhappily sulked away in silence. Your ability to self-reflect allows you to
realize that you are, in fact, the source of all these disparate thoughts.
MARK R. LEARY, THE CURSE OF THE SELF: SELF-AWARENESS, EGOTISM, AND THE QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE 29
(2004).
92

See SMITH, supra note 83, at 110. Smith elaborates:
Language ushered in a new phase in the timeless struggle between the forces of deception
and detection. Loading the dice heavily in favor of the former, it enabled human beings to
misrepresent reality much more effectively than had previously been possible. The sword of
language cuts two ways: it is both enlightening and bewitching, an instrument for
understanding and a snare for the unwary.

Id.
93
See infra Part III (illustrating the many ways humans judge others and make weighty decisions about them based
on their voice).
94
See infra text accompanying notes 260-64(on relatively clear versus relatively ambiguous language signals and
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Words, all words, necessarily require interpretation,98 and different interpreters will assign the
same words different meanings.99 Even the originator of a thought faces interpretive problems.
If your heart beats fast and your palms sweat, are you experiencing fear, anticipation, or loss?
Often you will be uncertain, struggling to decide. When you do, you will assign a label based on
your prior life experience, social context, and a wide array of other factors.100
Yet why should we care so deeply about having control over self-revelation? One important
answer, I will argue, lies in understanding the nature and causes of individual uniqueness versus
similarity and the social functions of each.
B. The Individual as Sui Generis
Pulitzer prize finalist, Judith Rich Harris, synthesizing the recent work being done on the
human mind by both cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists, has articulated a
persuasive explanation of why each individual is indeed in many ways unique while also sharing
so much in common with many others.101 To be sure, Harris recognizes the impact of the usual
suspects of individual heredity and the environment in explaining human variation.102 But she
also finds other powerful individual and social mechanisms at work by which each of us tries to
be like others in some ways, different from them in others. These mechanisms are rooted in
three systems or “modules” in the brain: the socialization, relationship, and status modules.103
1. The Socialization Module
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The socialization module or system works to make each of us more like those in our
group.104 “Groupness” is an important concept for humans. Humans have a strong need to
belong to a group, finding pleasure in solidarity and acceptance.105 Indeed, most of us consider
ourselves members of an array of groups, and part of our sense of uniqueness comes from the
particular intersection of our multiple group identities, for example, as a young Jewish
Northeastern heterosexual Democrat or a mature Christian Southern gay Republican.106 Group
membership brings not only its own psychic rewards but also the greater power and resources
stemming from cooperative group, relative to mere individual, action.107 Group membership can
also protect us from other groups hostile to our own.108 Indeed, groups struggle to distinguish
themselves from one another, and, sadly, positive group identity often turns on defining members
of other groups negatively, as outsiders.109 So powerful are these forces of categorization that, in
famous experiments, the mere labeling of groups led to violence between them, as when two
groups of eleven-year-old boys at Robbers Cave summer camp went to war110 and college
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students labeled “guards” in a mock prison quickly began the brutal humiliation of those students
labeled “prisoners.”111
The socialization system teaches us the rules for being like others in our group. 112 Each of us
observes the behavior of others in our group as we grow up, forming prototypes of appropriate
behavior for group members by computing averages of the behaviors observed.113 This learning
process includes understanding the social categories important to the group, thus necessarily
involving acceptance of stereotypes about outsider groups’ members.114 These sterotypes are at
their most powerful when we deal with strangers.115 Moreover, the in-group prototypes are not
necessarily perfect averages of observed group behavior but may be skewed toward the behavior
of the highest status members of the group.116
Group memberships’ hallmarks and changes in them are solidified by gossip.117 Membership
concepts and behavior are thus marked and evolve by “anti-memes,” ideas spreading like viruses
via language, the “anti” portion including ideas that “we” (the in-group) share but that “they”
(the out-group) do not.118 In this way, groups often grow to be unique, or at least so to perceive
themselves, working to distinguish their ways from others.119 Among the ways that groups mark
111
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their membership is via language differences, differences that in extreme situations can mark one
as worthy of life or of death.120 The Bible recounts one such story:
And the Gileadites took the passage of Jordan before the Ephraimites: and
it was so, that when those Ephraimites which were escaped and said, Let
me go over, that the men of Giliad said to him, Art thou an Ephraimite? If
he said, Nay, Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth; and he said
Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took
him, and slew him at the passage of Jordan: and there fell at that time of
the Ephraimites forty and two thousand. 121
As Harris herself analyzed the Shibboleth story, “Forty and two thousand might have been an
exaggeration, but however many there were of them, they died because they spoke with the
wrong accent.”122
2. The Relationship System
Like the socialization system, the relationship system likely had important
evolutionary advantages but of an almost opposite kind.123 Even without belonging to a group
with many shared understandings and behaviors, there are important differences among
individuals.124 The relationship system allows us first, to identify one individual as distinct from
others, second, to understand in as much depth as possible what makes that person unique.125
Physical qualities, such as facial appearance or the sound of a voice, may serve the first goal.126
But the second goal turns in part on our effectiveness as mindreaders.127 That effectiveness is
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critical to our social and material success, perhaps even to our survival.128 Thus the relationship
system’s
function is to furnish answers to evolutionarily important questions like
these: Will this person help me if I am in need? Does this person repay
favors? Can this person be relied upon to be a fair partner in trade? Is
this person a close relative? Would this person have sex with me?
Would this person be a good long-term mate? Can this person beat me
up? Does this person like me?129
The relationship system is thus “a discriminator, not a generalizer - - a splitter, not a lumper.”130
It serves “to make fine distinction among individuals,”131 importantly including distinctions
giving hints about the relative dominance and submissiveness of those interacting and of their
relative status in the group, judgments that, when made accurately, can help to resolve conflict or
even to avoid it in the first place.132 So important are these fine distinctions that we seek to make
them even when we have limited information, relying on generalizations, if need be.133 But we
recognize the importance of maximizing our information about another individual, especially
given the difficulty of mindreading and of that individual’s incentives to deceive.134 Yet again,
gossip is a critical source of such information, gossip necessarily requiring naming practices so
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that the participants can clearly identify the subject of that conversation’s gossip.135 Gossip also
helps us to update our knowledge of another with whom we have not of late had much contact
because recent information is better than its stale cousins.136
3. The Status System
Although each of us wants to be accepted by our group, emphasizing our
similarity or equality to others members, we also want to be better than those others, or at least
to know where we stand in the status hierarchy and how we might move up it or identify those
beneath us.137 Higher status is its own reward, but it also brings easier access to more
community resources.138 Culture can reduce status abuse and even the relative importance that
we assign to status versus equality, but humans are driven to make status judgments, and the
status system enables them to do so.139
Status inheres by definition in how most members of the community view you or would view
you if they knew you.140 Accordingly, judging our own status requires a special sort of
mindreading - - reading what status another assigns to us and why.141 Status is multidimensional
and varies with context. 142 A lousy athlete has low status on a baseball team. Yet if the same
person writes unusually well, he may have high status as a journalist.143 Knowing what status we
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are assigned in what setting thus not only tells us how to behave toward others but also how to
move up the status hierarchy, whether in that context or in another one.144 It is for this reason
that the status and relationship systems interact in an important way that contributes to the
development of human uniqueness.145
The process works thus. Someone observing us is driven by his relationship system to use his
mindreading skills and what he has learned about us from others to make judgments about our
unique qualities. His status mechanism will draw on these judgments to assign us a relative
status.146 But we, the observed, are in turn motivated by our status system to learn what status
judgments the observer has made about us and why.147 What any one observer thinks about us
does not give us status. Rather, we must mindread many such observers, computing an average
or “generalized other’s” conception of our status and where and why we were assigned it.148
Whether or not others’ assessments of us are accurate, they will make assessments that assign us
some unique or unusual combination of status-altering traits. Our assessment of that assignment
leads us to modify our behavior.149
For example, if we are perceived as physically weak but admired for our kindness, we might
more often choose settings where kindness is valued and work to emphasize what is kind about
our behavior. To be sure, we also could choose to go to a gym to bulk up, but our short stature
and delicate frame may make it hard for us to get much mileage out of this strategy, and it is, in
a chicken coop, modern human societies comprise thousands of different hierarchies, and a person at the bottom of
one may be at the top of another. The worst bowler on the company team may be the CEO; the college dropout may
be a billionaire.”).
144
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any event, easier for us to build on what we already see as our strengths. (On another trait, such
as being a poor dresser, we might have more ability to change, provided we have the money and
a good source of sartorial advice).150 Our kind behavior reinforces our self-image as kind, even
at the subconscious level, as do the rewards we receive in praise and self-satisfaction. 151
Repeated observations of our kindness lead to gossip about the trait, further improving our status
on that score in settings where it is valued.152 In addition to our actions, an important source of
whether others see us as kind is the words we use and whether they are perceived as sincere.153
Perceptions of our kind nature can also open doors to us where skilled kindness is needed that
might otherwise be closed.154 Our efforts to stand out on a trait, such as kindness, the social
science research suggests, tend to take root as longer-lasting aspects of our character if they
persist through about age 16.155 In this way are the best nurses and schoolteachers borne.
Persons who find status in physical strength and aggression, on the other hand, might become the
Sumo wrestlers and other athletes of the future.
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Apart from the benefits to the individual, this process of differentiation brings society the
benefits of diversity and specialization.156 Famed Scottish philosopher Adam Smith long ago
insightfully recognized the social advantages of this process in the economic realm, though its
advantages extend to all other social realms as well. Explained Smith:
The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much
less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to
distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is
not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division
of labor. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so
much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came
into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they
were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor play fellows
could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after,
they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of
talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees.157
This process, of course, takes place for many different personality traits and aspects of our
lives. The combination of qualities we each develop, through the interaction of the socialization,
relationship, and status systems, combined with genetic tendencies, current environment, life
experience, multiple group memberships, and happenstance make us uniquely who we are. 158
That part of our uniqueness that stems from the combined effects of the socialization,
relationship, and status systems turns in significant respects on the words we use, including what
we say about ourselves to ourselves and to others and how we and they respectively interpret and
react to those words. 159 Our control over self-revelation and our efforts to pierce others’ control
over their own revelation importantly shape our very sense of who we are, how we fit into the
broader social world, and what we become. Fully understanding this point requires
156
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understanding attribution theory160 in more detail, that is, the ways in which each of us and our
collectivities judge the worth of others’ thoughts, actions, and nature.
C. When We Are Judged
Humans by nature seek meaning, a sense of interconnection among observed events,
thoughts, and behaviors that make sense of our world.161 Part of meaning-making involves
privately crafting explanations of our own perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and actions to
ourselves.162 As noted previously, because such explanations occur by a form of internal
conversation - - thinking with words - - and all words are chosen by and require interpretation,
our efforts to explain ourselves to ourselves are necessarily interpretive.163 We seek these
private explanations to satisfy our curiosity about ourselves, allay confusion about what we do
and why, and improve our ability to control ourselves and thus to manipulate reality.164 Much
self-deception can be involved in this process, however, sometimes to our advantage, sometimes
to our disadvantage.165 But the process itself is inevitable.166
Correspondingly, we all seek, for analogous reasons, to develop our own internal
explanations of others’ behavior via the process of mindreading alluded to earlier.167 Part of
mindreading involves, however, making evaluative judgments about others, including assigning
blame to them for their thoughts, feelings, or actions.168 Yet each of us knows that others are

160

See JENNY MCEWAN, THE VERDICT OF THE COURT: PASSING JUDGMENT IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 10-11, 44
(2003) (defining attribution theory).
161
See MALLE, supra note 79, at 64 (defining meaning); BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 88 (“Most animals want to
feel pleasure and avoid pain. In human beings, as cultural animals, that same motivation is present, but it has been
transformed into the search for happiness. Happiness depends on meaning.”).
162
See MALLE, supra note 79, at 65-69, 71.
163
See supra text accompanying notes 96-100; Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 97, at 15-18, 24.
164
See MALLE, supra note 79, at 68-71.
165
See supra text accompanying notes 844-94; Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 88, at 394-98.
166
See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 33 (1990) (“[T]he central concept of a human psychology is meaning
and the processes and transactions involved in the construction of meanings.”).
167
See supra text accompanying notes 79-94.
168
See MALLE, supra note 79, at 68 (“Explanations aim at identifying the factors that generated the behavior, such
as reasons, emotions, specific situational factors, or traits”); MCEWAN, supra note 160, at 10-15, 26 (describing

33

also making similar culpability judgments about us.169 We also know that, even in everyday
situations, such judgments have short and long-term consequences, including informal sanctions
like snubbing, ignoring, ridiculing, or chastising the offender,170 creating a mechanism of social
norm enforcement,171 what has been called a privately-enforced system of “law in brief
encounters.”172
Partly to avoid these sanctions, and partly to obtain other positive benefits, such as improving
our social standing or manipulating others’ behavior, we are constantly generating public
explanations for our behavior too.173 These public explanations can also serve to satisfy others’
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curiosity, or lessen their confusion, about us or can promote the mutual understanding necessary
to coordinating joint plans and actions.174 Social psychologist Bertram Malle put the point thus:
Explanations have to be formulated in language to effectively change an
audience’s impressions, move their emotions, or direct their actions.
Clarifying one’s goals, excusing one’s actions, or presenting someone else’s
motives as virtuous all require communicating one’s explanation to an
audience. The social-interactive functions that are served by communicative
explanations constitute…[a] major motivation for behavior explanations.175
Relative social status plays an important role in determining the frequency and contact of the
behavior explanations a person offers. Those “lower in the power hierarchy will be inclined to
preemptively offer behavior explanations but not expect the same from those above them.”176
The explanations offered can include whether an action was intentional or not, the reasons (the
contributing beliefs and desires) for undertaking it,177 the causal history or background factors
that led to the rise of the reasons, and those factors that enabled the intention to be translated into
action.178 The degree of intentionality can vary - - for example, from negligence, to recklessness,
to knowledge, to purpose - - with more intentional acts seen as more blameworthy than less
intentional ones.179 The existence of a perceived duty to act in the face of a preventable harm
also increases blame-assessment.180
On the other hand, the more that a person’s reasons for action are attributed to her causal
history, “such as in her upbringing, personality, culture, or in the immediate context,” the less
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that her actions are viewed as truly chosen by her, thus the less culpable she appears.181
Personality assessments can cut both ways, moreover, for the more that a condemnable action
seems to stem from a fundamental character trait definitional of the actor’s nature, the more
disapproving a moral assessment his actions might also be given.182
So strong is the need to assess the moral quality of another’s actions in light of her reasons,
personal history, and context that observers lacking adequate information, especially about an
actor’s mental state, will infer it or construct it.183 If person-specific mental state information is
so scanty that it cannot be constructed, observers will search for general information about the
actor’s history and context and, if that quest fails, will postulate generic explanations - - “reasons
for why anybody might act that way.”184
Moreover, these same processes operate in connection with groups that are seen as jointly
acting, that is, as consisting of members who deliberate and act together as a unified agent. 185
Indeed, the behavior of such groups is even more likely to be attributed to group intentionality
and reason-choosing - - that is, to the group’s character and freely-made choices - - compared to
the less culpable factors of its background and history than is true for individuals.186 Perceptions
of group unity can come from cognitive biases and from propaganda,187 and the actions of
individual members of stereotyped groups may partly be assessed in light of those stereotypes.188
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Add into the mix the facts that observers are often willing to make sweeping judgments about
actors’ character based upon limited information; that such observers allow their perception of
one bad character trait to infect their overall assessment of the actor’s moral worthiness; and that
actors and observers often interpret the same behavior differently, and it becomes clear that each
of us faces the constant danger of suffering social sanctions upon being morally judged by others
with whom we interact.189 Those sanctions can be severe, even involving material deprivation
(e.g., by being fired from a job), when those others have more power and social status than we
do.190 These fears are terrifying when realized, even if we think that our judges have gotten the
facts right. But the emotional pain is still more severe when we believe that they have gotten it
wrong, misreading our intentions, character, and personal history or evaluating aspects of them
out of context.191
Apart from the righteous anger at being unfairly sanctioned for misjudgments, such
misjudgments are inherently painful even if little in the way of concrete penalties results.
Remember that each of us is driven to see ourselves as unique. This self-perception of
uniqueness is central to self-definition.192 Being misjudged as being different from whom we (in
our lights) truly are is thus experienced as an assault on our personhood, an attack on our soul.193
Remember too that our unique self-identity arises in significant part from how we believe others
see us.194 After a certain age, core parts of our self-identity become more resistant to, but likely
not impossible to, change.195 Others’ assessment of our nature is thus always important to us,
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always to some extent continuing to affect our character’s evolution, while social
misunderstandings of who we are feel like rejection of a lifetime of self-shaping and seem to
reflect an ignorance of the experiences and situational constraints from which we benefited or
suffered.196
Yet the risk of being mis-defined is enormous, for the self is a multiple rather than a unitary
concept - - we each have many sides.197 We may reveal selected aspects of ourselves in certain
contexts where we want to be judged by that portion of our character, such as when we convey
an image of professional competence, control, and reliability on the job.198 Yet to truly be
known for all of our many sides requires much time and experience and must occur slowly lest
we be misjudged, a part of our nature being taken for the whole.199 Accordingly, trust and
commitment are required for two people to know each other well, so we reserve relatively
unbridled self-revelation for intimate others. That self-revelation indeed becomes a marker of
intimacy.200 As Professor Jeffrey Rosen explains:
True knowledge of another person…requires the gradual setting aside of
social masks, the incremental building of trust, which leads to the
exchange of personal disclosure. It cannot be rushed….True knowledge
of another person, in all his or her complexity, can be achieved only with a
handful of friends, lovers, or family members. In order to flourish, the
intimate relationships on which true knowledge of another person depends
need space as well as time: sanctuaries from the gaze of the crowd in
which slow mutual self-disclosure is possible.201
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Others’ assessments of our desires, beliefs, and actions in even a single instance will have
some impact on their assessment of our overall character.202 Strong empirical and moral
arguments have indeed been mounted that our culpability assessments about another person are
and should be made based upon the extent to which a single bad action is seen as reflective of a
bad character.203 Yet being mis-defined, including by judging all of who we are based upon a
single perceived bad choice, causes us humiliation, indignity, and mental distress.204 There are,
Jeffrey Rosen again explains, “few experiences more harrowing than being described: [T]o be
described is to be narrowed and simplified and judged out of context.”205 Consequently, “there
are few acts more aggressive than describing someone else.”206
Now we can see what mental privacy is and why we hold it so dear. It is not so much
necessarily the content of any particular thought or feeling that we fear revealing as the risk that
it will be misunderstood or taken out of context and, especially, that we lose control over when,
how, and to whom it is revealed.207 That control helps us to avoid mis-definition; to maintain
our sense of being a unique, bounded personality, separate from the herd; and to manage our
social status and interpersonal relationships.208 Moreover, extensive revelations of many sorts
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are generally reserved for our most intimate others.209 Forced revelations to those outside this
small circle of friends and family can feel like forced intimacy with those for whom such a
relationship is neither desired nor intended.210 It is through language that we primarily express to
others our private thoughts and feelings. The sense of forced speech about ourselves and our
actions to strangers is, therefore, experienced as an invasion of the person and a betrayal of our
sacred relationships with our truly intimate others, degrading our social status and our sense of
equal worth.211
D. Criminal Justice
The ultimate culpability assessor is the criminal justice system. 212 The material
consequences of blame by that system are, of course, potentially far more severe than is the case
for more informal social systems: imprisonment or even death.213 Future job consequences are
diminished, and imprisonment especially can result in marriages killed, other family ties
strained, children abandoned, friends lost.214 Apart from these consequences, the fact of
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conviction, especially in modern American society, marks the convicted as an outsider to the
political community, a lesser being in fact if not formally so in law.215
Moreover, the condemnation represented by a conviction is far more extensive than, and of a
different nature from, that stemming from lesser wrongs. It is one thing to be blamed by one’s
spouse, children, or friends, or even by one’s church or neighborhood, for letting them down. It
is another thing entirely to also be blamed by the entire political community, yet that is just what
a criminal conviction represents.216
In practice, those subjected to the criminal law are also most often members of despised
groups or individuals otherwise already weak in social status and power.217 They also have the
fewest resources for painting what they see as an accurate picture of their essential nature and of
their life circumstances for them to be fairly judged by the courts.218
The public condemnation involved in a criminal conviction also helps to shape social
influences and social meanings, in turn affecting the meanings that individuals give to their own
and others’ actions.219 The law also sends signals that “can shape the emotions of the citizenry,”
for “[p]eople have some choice in forcing themselves to consider another person’s point of view
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or in directing their attention to other issues.”220 Whether the law treats spousal killing in
revenge for adultery lightly or harshly affects public perceptions about the acceptability of
certain emotions and of acting upon those emotions.221 But assessments of emotions and
resulting actions are closely linked to our overall assessment of another’s character.222 As two
leading social psychology specialists on culpability assessment put it, “[T]he law delivers a
message about what is acceptable, understandable, forgivable, or not. The law is part of the
system of cultural norms that influences how to behave, and therefore it is, in principle,
impossible to consider the effects of emotion on behavior as if they were independent of the
Law.”223
Unfortunately, the categories of the law do not always make room for the complexity of
human experience.224 For example, conflicting social norms can tear at an accused in a way that
cries out for mitigation.225 Yet the rules of law may not easily accommodate this reality. A
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defense lawyer can, however, help to present an accused’s story in a way that fits into the preexisting legal categories, pulling the law in practice closer to what the common sense justice of
folk wisdom demands. Emotion theorist J.R. Averill offered this example:
By attributing his response to anger (or temporary insanity), an accused
killer is in effect asking the jury to judge him not by the standards that
prohibit the deliberate taking of life, but by the standards (sometimes
called the “unwritten law”) that encourage protection of home and honor.
There is a problem, however. The proscription against homicide does not
allow many exceptions. The killing must therefore be redefined: No longer
is it the act of a normal human being; rather, it is the result of an irrational,
animal-like impulse (anger) or the symptom of a disease (temporary
insanity).226
The point is not necessarily that legal categories departing from folk ones are therefore wrong.
Rather, what matters is that the two categories often diverge, creating a risk of mis-defining who
the killer is and what he has done. From his perspective, the killing was done for the sake of
honor, but that is not a defense the law will allow. The killer is, of course, likely ignorant of the
specifics of the law.227 But this observation is no surprise because laypersons do generally view
the law as speaking a technical, priest-like language, divorced from everyday understandings.228

[P]eople’s sympathy toward crimes of passion is aroused not by the uncontrollability per se
of the emotion, but by the values that give rise to the emotion. Society and the Law want
people to value human life, but also to value marital fidelity, personal honor, and so on, and
these additional values require accommodation. From this perspective, the reasons why the
Law allows them mitigation or excusing of crimes of passion is that the community has
sympathy for the person who is torn between important values that are both endorsed by the
community.
Id. at 88.
226
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At some gut level, therefore, even the most truthful of suspects must understand the grave risk
that his words will be misunderstood or misused, with potentially tragic consequences.229
A second source of potential miscommunication in the law comes from its conception of
narrative. Narratives of course play a crucial role in any trial.230 But the criminal law usually
seeks to cabin those narratives, to limit them in time and space.231 Yet “[n]arratives exert a
strong influence over the perception of responsibility and culpability.”232 Emotions play a
central role in story-creation, yet emotions too have a narrative structure.233 Folk assessments of
emotions and culpability in fact have complex narrative structures that evolve over time and
space.234 We crave to know the history leading up to an emotional episode and ensuing action,
sometimes a quite extended history that examines childhood, school, and adolescence, work and
play experiences, and pivotal life events.235 Emotions themselves, cognitive psychologists have
come to recognize, are more processes developing over time than discrete responses.236 Yet the
law looks to a narrow frame of time and circumstances, emphasizing, for example, whether the
229
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shooter pleading self-defense feared imminent serious bodily injury at the precise moment of the
shooting over the extended life histories that may have brought the two parties to that fateful
moment.237 As psychology professors Norman J. Finkel and Gerrod Parrott conclude:
A potential conflict between folk and academic conceptions, on the
one hand, and the Law’s views, on the other, can already be foreseen. The
Law, with its typically narrow focus on the moment of the act, tends to see
emotions statically and as simplistic stories rather than as complex
narrative episodes in which appraisals develop and change across time,
situations and circumstances, and in which the very emotion may
transform into another emotion.238
The law thus raises the risk of mis-definition by simply narrowing the social framework and
breadth of individual life experiences that ordinary folks consider important in making
culpability assessments. It is again likely that persons ensnared in the criminal justice system
intuitively understand the miscommunication that may result from everyday culpability
assessments being strained through the filters of evidence and substantive criminal law.239 The
conflict between the widened vision of the everyday and the narrowed vision of the criminal law
has been well-captured, again by professors Finkel and Parrott, who explain:
Thus, in moral philosophy as in folk psychology, the moral
significance of emotions is bound up in the particularities of their context.
In everyday life, people think of emotions in narrative episodes because
they are concerned with what emotions say about events, responsibility,
and character, and when ordinary people enter the courtroom as jurors,
they frame evidence in narrative episodes (often in emotional episodes)
because they are concerned with assessing culpability in the context of the
“story” in which it occurs.240
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In sum, the criminal justice system raises special and heightened risks of mis-description
with unique and dramatically more severe potential consequences. It may be good for the soul to
choose to confess to one’s priest in the isolation of the confessional box knowing that your
secrets go no further than the clergyman’s ears. It may even be redemptive to confess to a narrow
circle of friends and family, recognizing the risk that they may spread your tale beyond its
intended audience.241 But compelled confessions in the context of the criminal justice system are
of a wholly different order. They are sui generis and should be treated as such.
III. The Literal Voice
As mentioned earlier, by the “literal voice” I mean those aspects of the sound and content of
our voices that, often unconsciously, influence our self-concept and our relationships with other
persons and groups. The concept of the literal voice includes the content of our words for the
overt information that they purport to transmit but also includes their covert or meta-information
- - information about our social status, personality, emotions, geographical location, group
affiliations, gender, and intelligence.242 It is the meta-information that I emphasize here because
it is that aspect of the literal voice that courts and legal commentators so often ignore.
American culture tends to emphasize the eye over the ear, the written over the spoken.243 Yet
the spoken word is the more fundamental form of communication.244 It is speech that evolved
first, our brains developing into high-speed computers for extracting social information from
spoken words.245 Every culture develops categories associating certain speech qualities with
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certain social characteristics, such as social status or power.246 Humans seek to identify each
person’s voice as a mark of a unique individual, an essential component part of what makes each
of us different from one another, while also using the voice as a way to identify or create
commonalities.247 Gossip in particular evolved partly to promote social bonding.248 The written
word necessarily functions differently - - lacking, for example, tone, volume, and pitch - - from
the spoken.249 Yet writing is ultimately derivative of speaking, another medium for the
expression of voice, a point to which I will return later.250
Sociologist Anne Karpf has summarized the importance of the human voice this way:
Throughout our lives we make decisions, often unwittingly, on the
basis of the sound of a person’s voice: lovers as well as political
candidates get selected for vocal reasons. Our lilt, twang, or tremor is
eloquent beyond words. The voice can also make sentences do
somersaults. “I don’t think so” might be an innocent expression or
withering sarcasm - - the voice tells us which. “Not bad” - - given the
right tone - - can glow with praise. Yet signal oddly with your voice - - by
transgressing the normal codes of volume, pause, and pitch - - and you can
entirely sabotage conversation, turning sense into nonsense.251
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The voice can convey information about ourselves that we choose to reveal, many of us
“code-switching,” having different voices for different situations or audiences.252 “From
teachers to receptionists to lawyers, around a quarter of the total labor force is in a vocally
demanding profession, or uses their voice as their primary tool of trade.”253 Yet the Wall Street
lawyer who chooses to convey confidence and a sense of noblesse oblige with his corporate
clients may lapse into the relaxed street slang of his Bronx roots when returning to the old
neighborhood, baby talk when alone with his lover, or use soft, high-pitched tones when reading
fairy tales to his four year old child.254 But merely by speaking we can also convey much that
we might prefer to hide. The sound of our voice can reveal illness, intoxication, and exhaustion,
social class, education, and sexual desire.255 Our voice can encourage intimacy or distance,
instill confidence or fear, undermine or support an opponent or friend, frequently without our
conscious awareness or willingness to do these things.256 Voice is essential to the development
of healthy emotional ties, empathy, and social skills but can unwittingly erode all those things.257
Even if all we are doing is reading sewage disposal regulations aloud, “our voice is doing
something terrifyingly intimate - - leaking information about our biological, psychological, and
social status. Through it, our size, height, weight, physique, sex, age and occupation…can be
detected.”258 As voice specialist Anne Karpf again explains, the voice:
Bridges our internal and external worlds. Traveling from our most private
recesses into the public domain, revealing not only our deepest sense of
who we are, but also who we wish we weren’t. It’s a superb guide for fear
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and power, anxiety and subservience, to another person’s vitality and
authenticity as well as our own.259
This invasion of the self can be unsettling, therefore, even when the judgments made based
upon our voice are accurate.260 But the human drive to make such judgments is so strong that
others will do so even when they are often wrong or their voice sample and other contextual
information is limited.261 Accordingly, having control over when and how we talk is central to
our efforts to control what sides of ourselves we reveal, in what contexts, and for what purposes.
Yet this control is limited. By speaking at all, we reveal much we might rather not and face the
risk that judgments, fair and unfair, accurate or not, will be made about our essential nature.262
These judgments have psychic impacts, affecting our self-esteem and self-identity, and having
social and material impacts, affecting whether others trust us, open themselves up to us, offer us
educational or employment opportunities, invite us into their groups, or welcome us into their
homes.263 Control over our voice is thus critical to maintaining our mental privacy. At some
level, conscious or not, we understand this power of the voice, and we both celebrate and fear it.
This section III of this article seeks to elaborate why this is so, exploring the voice’s power in the
illustrative areas of emotion-reading, personality judgments, relative social status generally,
group belonging and exclusion, and gendered relationships. Next this section considers the
implications of the written word and technology and their implications for better understanding
259
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the privilege against self-incrimination, before turning, in the article’s penultimate section, to the
idea of linguistic compulsion as at the heart of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
A. Voicing Emotions
Emotions focus our attention on whatever causes them. The more intense the emotion,
the more focused is our attention.264 Voices can powerfully convey, both by their sound and
content, emotions, while simultaneously eliciting them in others.265 “Turn, here now! Oh, my
God!,” screamed in terror by a car passenger, for example, tends to elicit fear, intense
concentration, and immediate aversive action by the driver.266
Emotions also alter how we filter experience, including concerning matters unrelated to the
event that originally elicited the emotion.267 A happy person is simply more likely than a sad one
to interpret experiences in a positive rather than a negative fashion.268 Positive emotions also
improve, on the one hand, much thinking flexibility and efficiency, making it easier to find
creative solutions to difficult problems.269 Simultaneously, on the other hand, positive emotions,
perhaps paradoxically, increase reliance on stereotypes, making their bearer more likely to be
“influenced by labels, such as the gender, accent, and personality [believed to be revealed
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by]…the voice.”270 Positive emotions also make their bearers more risk averse.271 But our
voices can often reveal our emotions in very subtle ways. Meanwhile, listeners are primed to try
to read emotions from our voices, sometimes doing so accurately, sometimes not.272 Yet what
listeners perceive in speakers’ emotions can and does alter the listeners’ own feelings.273
Frequently this happens because listeners mimic the emotions that they perceive in speakers,
including in their voices.274 Emotions can thus become contagious.275
Voices convey emotions by variations in speech rate, pitch average, pitch range and intensity,
voice quality, pitch changes and their speed, and the precision and nature of articulation.276
Depression is notably readily identifiable via the voice, which becomes quieter, less inflected,
and “has a dull, lifeless quality,”277 trailing off at the end of a sentence, “as if the speaker is
sighing while talking.”278 Writer William Styron recalled that his depression resulted in “the
lamentable near-disappearance of my voice. It underwent a strange transformation, becoming at
times quite faint, wheezy and spasmodic - - a friend observed later that it was the voice of a 90year old.”279 The voices of manic-depressives in their manic phase, by contrast, are vigorous,
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with glides, frequent emphases, and wide pitch variation. 280 Yet voices convey emotions not
merely for the mentally ill but in every human encounter.281
This observation does not necessarily mean, however, that we are as accurate as with these
extreme situations in judging more subtle emotional cues in voices. Judgments about another’s
emotions are initially made very quickly, and we are most likely to judge correctly with those we
know best.282 Indeed, vocal sensitivity to another’s emotions is one important hallmark of an
intimate relationship, a reflection of one person’s more complete knowledge of another’s habits
and behavior.283 Voice-reading is thus “a form of empathy: we tune into what another person is
thinking and feeling….”284 We supplement our judgments about another’s emotions with
observations about their facial expressions and about the social context in addition to the sound
and content of their voices.285 Nevertheless, errors in our judgments may lead to
miscommunication and conflict, especially between intimates, whom we expect to do better.286
There is also some evidence of gender variation in the ability to detect emotions from voice,
women doing the better job, and of parenting styles influencing children’s development of this
skill.287 Less powerful or lower status people are also more likely to be “finely attuned to
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nuances in the voices of those people with authority over them,” such as children’s sensitivity to
the vocal nuances of parents and teachers, “a form of protection against adult fiat.”288
A listener believing that he has perceived a speakers’ emotions will often subconsciously
physically react in a similar fashion, a way of building empathy, which in turn increases the
accuracy of the listener’s judgments in reading emotions.289 The listener’s subjective experience,
partly because of these physiological changes, will also often change to match the speaker’s
feelings.290 In these ways, among others, speakers’ emotions “infect” listeners.291 Yet,
remember, changed emotions mean changed perceptions, attitudes, and reasoning styles.292
Moreover, emotional contagion by voice can happen to groups as well as individuals.293
Furthermore, voice can influence listeners’ moods - - their sustained emotions - - as well as their
more fleeting feelings.294 Vocal emotional contagion is manipulated by movie producers,
loudness, screaming, and crying, for example, being ways to transmit powerful emotions or
moods that rivet the audience’s attention to the source of their reaction.295 Vocal emotional and
mood manipulation, because it alters perception, reasoning, and attention, is also a powerful tool
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of persuasion, including as used by politicians or social activists seeking to motivate political
enthusiasm in their supporters or to expand the size of the supporter pool.296
Inconsistency between voice content and tone can be perceived as insincerity - - “I am so
sorry” said flatly or mockingly, for example - - and can be jarring.297 Consistency between the
two makes the speaker better liked by listeners.298 Our ability to judge others’ emotions vocally
and to react with vocal appropriateness also affects their feelings toward us.299 Thus listeners
generally prefer speakers conveying happy emotions.300 But the expression of negative emotions
can sometimes elicit valuable responses, such as when we vocally convey vulnerability, leading
a listener to protect us, or when a listener becomes more trusting of us when we are willing to
expose to them an attitude of submission - - much like the reaction a dog seeks in exposing its
belly.301
This last example emphasizes two roads for emotions - - the “low” road of the unconscious
and the “high” road of the conscious mind.302 Many of the emotions we vocally convey or
perceive happen rapidly and unconsciously.303 But our slower, more deliberative, conscious
assessments of a situation - - frequently made in the form of an internal mental self-conversation
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- - can alter our assessments of a situation, such as whether we were correct in perceiving danger
or fear in another’s voice.304 Altered assessments in turn alter emotions and moods.305
But here is the rub. Speakers can also make conscious assessments, permitting them to
attempt to alter their vocal expressions to convey emotions by conscious choice. Sometimes
these efforts may be sincere ones to communicate feelings more clearly, other times calculated
efforts to mislead a listener about our true emotions.306 People vary in their ability successfully
to feign emotions.307 Combine this observation with variation in individuals’ ability accurately
to read emotions and a real risk arises of a good faker’s taking advantage of a poor judger.308
Add to the mix the reality that the content of our words - - such as reporting a dangerous event - can, separate and apart from the pitch, volume, and other aspects of the sound of our words - alter listener’s emotions, and it becomes clear, in ways both large and small, how the emotional
voice can be a conscious tool of political power as well as a means for promoting intimacy or
distancing.309 The power of the emotion-laden and emotion-inducing voice, the often
unconscious processes that may leak what we wish kept secret, the risk of misunderstanding and
resulting ill consequences, and the dangers of manipulation all make the simple acts of speaking
and listening as dangerous as they are advantageous.
B. Personality
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People are frequently drawn to others whom they perceive as having similar
personalities.310 Simultaneously, people are most comfortable with other persons about whom
clear personality judgments can be made. Ambiguity or inconsistency in indicators of personality
causes discomfort, dislike, and confusion.311 The relative influence of these drives toward
similarity-attraction and consistency itself varies with the judger’s personality. Persons who are
more outwardly-oriented toward social relationships care more about similarity to others, while
inner-oriented persons give greater weight to consistency.312
Similarity and consistency matter to judgers because of the resulting perceived social
benefits.313 If one person has a clear image of another person’s having a similar personality, that
makes the latter’s behavior and thoughts more predictable to the first person.314 This perceived
predictability occurs because he can imagine how he would behave or think in similar
situations.315 Furthermore, less cognitive effort to make such predictions is required than would
be true were the first person facing someone of an ambiguous or very different personality.316
Predictability promotes a sense of safety, while similarity both implies familiarity, which leads to
liking, and social support, which leads to sharing, including of such things as food, shelter,
rituals, and language.317
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This need for predictability contributes to the “fundamental attribution error,” our willingness
to make confident and global character judgments about others - - even those others very
different from ourselves - - based upon very limited evidence.318 Predictability also helps to
explain why, if we know little of another’s personality, we prefer those people behaving like
extroverts because expressive people are seen as more predictable than reticent ones.319
The voice is often viewed as a window into another’s soul. Several paralinguistic features of
voice are taken as personality indicators, at least in American culture.320 Notably, volume alone
implies character: “compare the booming voice of a person who loves socializing to the soft
voice of someone who prefers to read books.”321 How high or low is one’s pitch also affects
personality perceptions, such as the high voice of the “hyperactive comedian” versus the “deep
voiced news anchor.”322 Pitch range matters too, as in the wide pitch swings of the “animated
story teller” compared to the “monotone delivery of the technical presenter.” 323 Likewise, those
whose intonation rises at the end of an assertion are viewed as tentative while those whose tone
falls appear self-confident.324 Speech rate conveys an exuberant nature for the fast talker and a
calm one for the more deliberate speaker.325 These four indicators of volume, pitch, pitch
variation, and speech rate may have an even more powerful impact on personality assessment
than does speech content.326 Moreover,
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Each of these voice characteristics tells us something about a person,
but in combination they become particularly influential. For example,
when people meet someone who speaks loudly and rapidly, in a high
pitch, and with a wide voice range, they feel confident that they are
dealing with the life of the party. Conversely, when people hear a soft,
deep, monotone voice speaking slowly, they feel equally confident that
this person is shy.327
High-pitched, rapid voices with wide frequency range are also perceived as warm and
sympathic, those with the opposite voice characteristics being “hermits and misanthropes, who
have contempt for others but don’t actively attack or defend….”328 Perhaps more importantly,
however, loud, deep voices of limited range (think John Wayne) convey dominance - - persons
who control their environments - - while soft, high voices of wide range are apparent
submissives, “buffeted by events and people and…essentially actionless.”329 Dominance brings
with it high social status, while submissiveness is associated with low social status.330
Voice content, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, also conveys personality signals. For
example, words urging others to action rather than requesting it mark extroverts, as do words
demonstrating confidence rather than insecurity.331 More specific, concrete descriptions of
events may lead to a more positive evaluation of the speaker than do vague, cursory ones.332 If
content cues and paralinguistic ones conflict, that conveys an ambiguity of personality, with all
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the ill consequences of that confusion described above.333 Consistency, by contrast, makes a
speaker more likeable.334
Yet there is little empirical evidence suggesting that our voice-based personality assessments
are accurate. What little research there is often suggests the opposite.335 So, once again, the mere
act of speaking - - which always activates quick, automatic, unconscious personality judgments - risks grave misunderstanding of the speaker’s nature by his audience, potentially leading them
to dislike him, distrust him, dismiss him, or dominate him.336 But, above all, is his fear that they
will misjudge him, or at least rob him of the chance to control the evidence upon which these
judgments are made.337
E. Status Generally
Paralinguistic features of speech both reflect and help to create our position in the social
hierarchy - - our “social status” - - and our social connection to, or distance from, socially salient
groups.338 Social roles are those conventional modes of behavior society expects to be adopted
by persons of a certain status, conventions that pointedly include linguistic features.339 Each
person plays a variety of roles in her life, each correlated to a different status within and between
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various social groups.340 For example, a man who is an apprentice at work may hold a low social
status there but a higher one at home if his spouse and children perceive him as the head of the
family. Accordingly, his speech loudness, intonation, tempo, rhythm, and other linguistic
features will vary between those two settings.341 Although different roles elicit linguistic
differences, such differences are themselves understood by listeners as markers of social roles or
status, even if the audience knows nothing else about the speaker but his words.342 Thus a man
using a standard accent (the one most prized by his society), speaking quickly and fluently, with
few hesitations, is seen by his audience as more competent, dominant, and dynamic than those
who lack these features.343 On the other hand, a person using regional or ethnic accents,
disfluent and halting speech, is more likely to be seen as relatively incompetent and submissive,
of a low social status, yet may also be seen by many hearers as more approachable and likeable
than his imposing high status counterpart.344
One important indicator of solidarity with, or distance from, members of various social
groups is geographic: do speaker and listener hail from the same home territory?345 Although
Americans are geographically mobile, the place of their youth may always hold a powerful
psychic pull on them, as may, in a different way, their current place of residence.346 Ex-New
Yorkers may proudly identify themselves as such, Tennesseans may boast of their Southern
charm and hospitability, and naturalized American citizens may wear clothes or join social clubs
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that draw on customs of the “old country.”347 Each person may vary in the intensity with which
geographic ties matter to him or her, but for many people those ties are strong. They matter
because they are one basis for a sense of group-solidarity, which also often means a sense of
distinctiveness and separation from other, perhaps opposing, groups.348 Linguistic features,
particularly accent (distinctive ways of pronunciation) and dialect (distinctive forms of grammar
and vocabulary), are powerful indicators of geographic ties.349 When anyone wishes to
emphasize his connection to a geographic group, he tries to speak like that group’s members, and
not like those of other groups. The Mississippian migrant to New York City who years later
retains a heavy Southern drawl, peppering her conversations with “y’all,” is making a conscious
or unconscious statement of Southern pride.350 Linguistics professor David Crystal made the
point this way:
It seems totally natural to speak like the other members of our own group
and not to speak like the members of other groups. The tendency, well
recognized in modern sociolinguistics, is called accommodation. It is an
ability which probably emerged early on in the evolution of the human race
because it had considerable survival value. When primitive people heard
voices outside a cave, did they go outside to greet them with a smile or
proceed cautiously with a club? Recognizing the Cro-Magnon equivalent of
an accent would have made all the difference.351
Group membership is partly an individual’s choice concerning with which group to
identify.352 Actual or feigned accent or dialect can be a way to announce or share group
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membership based on ethnicity, religion, or innumerable other traits rather than on geography.353
As someone born in America to American-born Jewish parents whose own parents were
immigrants from the Ukraine, I can offer this example: my friends and family members often
lapse among themselves into exaggerated Eastern European accents, periodically filling our
speech with Yiddish phrases. We do so as a way of social bonding and expressing ethnic and
religious pride, even though most of us ordinarily have New York accents more than Eastern
European ones, do not know the meaning of most Yiddish words, and are not particularly
observant of religious ritual. Language use of this sort is an effective means of ethnic bonding
because it is a widespread feature of community life, offers a link with a shared imagined past,
and acts as a natural demarcation line among cultural groups.354
Socioeconomic class is also often assumed to be indicated by speech patterns.355 Each of us
perceives some features of vocabulary and grammar as associated with intelligence and
education, others with intellectual weakness and ignorance.356 These common perceptions were
well illustrated in the play “My Fair Lady,” in which the lead male character, a professor, can
turn his charge, Eliza Dolittle, into a lady only by purging her of her lower-class Cockney accent
and dialect.357 A real world American illustration comes from the dropping of “g”s at the end of
words, a pronunciation typical of much of the speech of the modern American working class.358
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This feature might be combined with slurred pronunciation of adjacent words. Thus “Whatcha
doin’?” is associated with the lower classes and “What are you doing?” with the higher ones.359
Race is not correlated with any distinctive speech patterns, but race/class sub-groups are
often perceived by those higher in the social hierarchy as displaying such patterns.360 Thus
African-American English Vernacular (AAEV) is a form of non-standard English most often
studied among economically lower-class African-Americans in urban areas.361 AAEV includes
such features as dropping the final “s” in the third person singular (“he walk,” “she go”) and
using the “invariant be” (“Sometimes they be walking round here”).362 These same features are,
however, found in many white English dialects, particularly in the Southern United States.363
This observation has led some commentators to conclude that AAEV arose from white dialects
but then became associated with race as a result of Southern Black immigration to the North.364
As one author put it:
The association with blacks is then explained as a result of their
emigration to the northern cities, where those features were perceived as a
distinctive marker of ethnic, as opposed to regional, identity. With the
development of urban ghettos, the contrast became more marked over
time.365
Other commentators instead conclude that AAEV arose primarily from a Creole English spoken
by the first Blacks on American shores, though mixed with white dialects’ influence.366
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Whatever AAEV’s origin, middle class Whites may hear that dialect as a sign of intellectual
inferiority and a marker of danger.367
Gender matters too. Some feminist theorists have long posited a “women’s language,” a set
of linguistic features characteristic of how women speak in most settings.368 Among the posited
features are the use of “meaningless particles” like “my goodness”; “empty adjectives”
expressing entirely emotional assessments, as in “It’s adorable!,” and use of hedges like “I
guess” or “I think,” conveying uncertainty.369
Research has failed to confirm, or disconfirm, the existence of a women’s speech constant
across contexts.370 Nevertheless, research has revealed some linguistic forms that women are
more likely to use than men in a wide variety of settings. These forms include more expressions
of positive politeness, sympathy, and understanding; fewer commands and threats; more phrases
like “you know,” which show an effort to engage the addressee’s attention; and more statements
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of self-reference, such as “It seems to me,” which show respect.371 Moreover, when women use
imperatives, they are more likely to do so in question form and with qualifiers, as in “Would you
get me that report by Monday, if at all possible?”372 Many of these observed differences are,
however, more likely due to setting, topic, role, and status. For example, those in lower-status
positions (as are many women) use such politeness strategies toward those of higher status.373
Even when women do not use “women’s language,” however, they are perceived as doing
so.374 This perception arises because our stereotypes or “folklinguistic” beliefs about how
women speak closely track the descriptions of women’s language.375 Stereotypes lead us to
ignore contrary evidence while attending to confirming evidence.376 Furthermore, thee biases are
magnified by the “fundamental attribution error,” our tendency to attribute behavior more to
personality than context. 377 Consequently, when we see many women in low-status roles
speaking politely, we attribute that behavior to women’s essential nature rather than to their
role.378 The resulting linguistic stereotypes resist change, as they have in American culture for
more than twenty years. 379
One effect of perceiving women’s language where it does not exist and of viewing it as
typical female behavior is the self-fulfilling prophecy.380 Women learn that they will be ignored
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or disliked if they violate stereotypical norms, so they try not to deviate too much from those
norms.381
Although other factors, such as age, race, and class, can reduce the effects of stereotypes, the
effects are greatest where gender is most salient.382 But gender is most salient in initial
encounters or where women are in the minority.383 Our gendered cognitive biases lessen,
however, as we get to know individuals better.384
The effect of the real or imagined use of women’s language can be devastating to a woman’s
credibility. Anyone using women’s language is evaluated as more caring but less credible,
competent, and intelligent.385 These evaluations are magnified when women, rather than men,
are the speakers.386 Furthermore, the indirectness supposedly characteristic of women’s
language may be seen as insecurity, apology as weakness.387 Additionally, women’s language
speakers’ use of shorter, less aggressive responses in public settings commands less attention.388
Similarly, their giving reasons for their suggestions and arguing from their personal experience
rather than from abstract principle, two “feminine” strategies, are relatively unpersuasive to
men.389 These effects are much larger in laboratory settings than in the few studies involving
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naturally occurring speech, but even modest effects can be decisive in criminal cases.390 There,
defense victory requires only “reasonable doubt.”391
Yet women face a double bind if they violate stereotypical speech norms.392 Most men
simply do not like aggressive women. “There is a sense in which every woman is seen as a
receptionist–available to give information and help, perennially interruptible.”393 Women who
violate stereotypes may seem unlikable or unworthy to many men.394 Furthermore, men resist
receiving information from those, like women, whom men perceive as of lower status because
being lecturer rather than listener is the superior (i.e., men’s) role.395
In sum, women may be perceived as using women’s language when they are not, a
perception marking them as stupid, incompetent, and incredible. Yet too masculine a style
means they will be disliked or ignored. For a woman to be seen as credible, she must walk a fine
line between opposed stereotypes.
This discussion of gender also highlights the broader importance of such contextual features
as setting (the time and place of speaking, for example, in church or at work); the number of
participants and the relationship among them (such as bystander versus intimate or superior
versus subordinate); and the activity, notably cross-examining or debating, lecturing or
dialoguing.396 Lower status persons speaking in public settings like courtrooms will often find
390
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themselves speaking a more “powerless language,” akin to that of the posited women’s language
just discussed; facing frequent interruptions from higher status figures like lawyers; and
struggling to hold the floor and tell their complete story.397 Their testimony will more likely be
perceived as less credible than those using higher-status linguistic forms.398 In short, though
many factors affect victory or defeat at trial, lower status witnesses start with the linguistic deck
stacked against them.
Other legal settings that can prove to be problematic for laymen and lower-status speakers
are conversations with undercover officers or interrogations by badge-carrying officers.399
Linguists have extensively documented how undercover agents can encourage ambiguous but
arguably inculpatory suspect statements; cut off suspect efforts to explain or more clearly specify
those statements; camouflage the illegal nature of agent offers made to the suspect, while later
arguing that that criminal nature was obvious; and use leading questions, misinterpreting
minimal suspect responses (e.g., Uh-huh”) as signs of agreement with the agent’s implied
statements rather than discomfort with their ambiguity or potential criminal nature.400 These
strategies are rarely apparent to juries, who often give the resulting statements unfairly
inculpatory explanations and undue weight.401 Other researchers have extensively documented
similar strategies in police interrogation practices.402
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None of these observations are meant to suggest that these police and prosecutor tactics are
illegitimate (they may or may not be). Rather, the points to be made are first, that suspect
statements to criminal justice system actors necessarily expose the suspect to being mis-judged
and mis-defined based on only partial and ambiguous evidence of his fundamental nature; and,
second, that the criminal justice system creates particularly grave dangers that a suspect will lose
control over the timing, degree, and content of self-revelation. In both respects, therefore, the
suspect faces significant incursions upon his mental privacy.
D. Written and Internet Communications
Do written and internet communications also involve mental privacy concerns given that
such communications lack the paralinguistic cues found in face-to-face speech? The answer is
“yes,” though the nature, emphasis, and degrees of privacy may vary among these three media.
Writing differs from face-to-face oral communication (speech) in numerous ways. Speech is
usually time-bound (it occurs only at a particular moment in time), dynamic, transient, with all
parties present and specific addressees in mind.403 Writing, at least before the advent of the
computer, was and often still is space-bound (but it can be read at a variety of times), static,
permanent, with great distance between speaker and recipient and often unknown addressees
(e.g., those among the pool of readers who choose, though their identity is unbeknownst to the
author, to pick up his book).404 Writing deprives recipients, in particular, of contextual signals to
meaning, such as tone of voice, pitch, accent, body language, facial expressions, and eye
contact.405 These cues allow for efforts immediately to be made to clarify ambiguities and fill in
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gaps.406 Moreover, conversation is negotiated in the sense that a speaker receiving a poor
reception can quickly alter how and what he says. 407 Furthermore, apart from monologues and
formal speeches, most oral communication is instantly interactive, a ready exchange among
parties, an on-the-spot dialogue or even multi-logue.408 Additionally, these aspects of speech
seem to encourage greater intimacy, where desired, than does writing, and paralinguistic clues
can soften verbal blows, promote empathy, and encourage agreement, at least if the parties want
to achieve these results.409 Writing, at least in laymen’s hands, by contrast can appear cold,
mechanical, unyielding, and incomplete.410 Writing may also seem more easily subject to
deception because of the great faith many of us have in our ability to judge others’ demeanor, to
read their minds from their face and body.411
Yet the human need to give meaning to communications, including inferences about the
parties’ essential character, is so strong that readers will make quick, definite judgments on these
matters though lacking the usual informational resources offered by speech.412 “The desire to
form impressions of other people,” explained internet psychologist Patricia Wallace, relying
upon the work of famed sociologist Erving Goffman, “and to manage our own impressions in
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social settings, are fundamental human characteristics….”413 If necessary, therefore, readers will
rely on stereotypes, biases, and heuristics, globalizing from what little information they have,
filling in gaps in their mind’s picture of another person on the flimsiest of evidence.414 A postWorld War II experiment by psychologist Solomon Asch illustrates the point. Asch gave his
experimental subjects a list of words describing a person, then asked the subjects to describe
their image of this person’s character in ways other than those listed.415 He repeated this
experiment numerous times, changing one word at a time.416 Asch discovered that changing a
single word - - the word “warm” to “cold” - - changed the positive reactions to the person
described to sharply negative ones, making him an unlikable, unpopular, disagreeable
cheapskate.417 Readers also form impressions about character from a writer’s handwriting and
its neatness or sloppiness, size, slant, and aesthetic appeal.418 The dangers of misjudging another
person who communicates only by writing are large.
Yet, precisely because of these dangers, conventions have developed enabling writers to
mimic much of the paralinguistic information conveyed by speech. Spelling variations can
indicate dialect (e.g., “color” for Americans, “colour” for the British) and accent, such as writing
“sez,” rather than “says,” to indicate a non-standard accent.419 Punctuation can also indicate the
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rhythm and color of speech.420 Question marks indicate a rising intonation at the end of a
sentence, while exclamation points and italics suggest differing degrees of emphasis.421
Quotation marks create the sense of verbatim speech, while letter repetition (“ye-e-es”) can
indicate hesitation or confusion.422 In fiction or in informal non-fiction writing, colloquialisms,
unfinished sentences, and long strings of uninterrupted clauses can also create the feel of live
speech.423 Moreover, the mark of an excellent writer is often said to be his unique command of
written stylistic features, giving him his own “personal voice.”424 Of course, no literal voice in
the sense of sounds is involved, for writing is more about the eye than the ear.425 Yet the voice
metaphor seems apt to describe an author’s writing style. Although such a style may be most
obvious in fiction (who cannot recognize a favorite author’s style?), unique style marks the best
non-fiction writing too.426 Where the writer is someone whom the reader has heard speak before,
the writer’s cadences may particularly come alive. I often write to my nephew, Jason. When I
point out an apparent hole in some argument he has made, he always begins his response with a
single word: “True.” He then proceeds to make a different argument nevertheless intended to
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demolish my position and fill the hole in his own. I laugh whenever he does this because it is a
hallmark of his informal non-fiction writing and his speech. Jason seems almost to be in the
room with me, speaking face-to-face.
Writing is useless, of course, without reading, and the connection between the two often
involves some kind of voice. As the example of my nephew Jason reveals, most of us hear a
voice in our heads when we read.427 Interestingly, indeed, most people read silently at about the
same pace as they would read out loud.428 Children likewise learn to read by reading aloud, and
many forms of writing, from plays, to poetry, to political speeches, are meant to be orally
performed in public.429 Even fluent readers facing new or different words might move their lips
or sub-vocalize to become familiar with the sound of the new words.430
None of these observations show that writing makes up entirely for the advantages of face-toface conversation. But writing has some advantages of its own. The very process of writing aids
and clarifies thought, indeed, “Full meaning does not always exist prior to writing; often the
process works in reverse.”431 Writing requires more planning and precision than speaking to
avoid miscommunication precisely because there is no immediate opportunity to judge audience
reaction and because the audience may be large, diverse, and its members and their
preconceptions unknown to the author.432 Writing’s permanence allows repeated reading and
close analysis of text in a way that the ephemeral words of a conversation cannot.433 The
resulting debate can thus often be more informed and sophisticated. Writing also encourages
wider debate than face-to-face oral communication because writing extends over time and space,
427
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reaching persons who would otherwise be locked out of discussion.434 Writing’s permanence
aids memory, allowing ideas to have more lasting impact.435 For many of these reasons, some
legal obligations can be created only in writing, and some religions center upon a written sacred
text.436 Specialized forms of writing can also identify those sharing it as “in-group” members - witness the special form of experimental reports in the field of psychology - - and can serve to
build group solidarity and cohesion, as some commentators argue is true for lawyers using the
unique style of legal writing.437 Writing can also be a way of self-understanding, helping you to
clarify your feelings via internal dialogue, a function served by diaries, detailed calendar entries,
and psychotherapeutic checklists of “flawed thoughts” that cause depression.438 Writing is,
therefore, a mixed bag. It is a less natural skill than speaking, is harder to do well, and lacks the
warmth and immediacy of face-to-face voice communication. But writing conventions, the need
for pre-planning, and its aid in thinking may in some ways make its message more truly from
“us.” Anyone who has experienced the pain of having his or her writing critiqued understands
how deeply our writing can seem to be a part of us, an extension of ourselves.439
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Although much of this article has discussed the paralinguistic features of the spoken word,
writing reminds us that the semantic content of the words themselves are important means by
which we express aspects of our nature. Linguistic sociologist Anne Karpf makes this point
eloquently in de-bunking the public understanding of the work of UCLA psychology professor
Albert Mehrabian.440 Mehrabian, created “an entire theory about human communication based
on [experiments involving] three women saying one word, followed by two women reading eight
words - - reading, not even spontaneously saying - - and two women listeners ‘imagining’ these
words being spoken to someone else, and speculating about what feeling was being
suppressed.”441 From these few, small-sample, highly flawed experiments, Mehrabian suggested,
or at least those popularizing his work have suggested, that “only 7 percent of meaning in human
communication comes from words, the rest from the voice and face.”442 But, insists Karpf, “It’s
palpably absurd to suggest that in human conversation words play such an insignificant role, and
the face such a major one: it clearly depends on who is talking to whom, when, where, and
why.”443 This observation is even more apt for written communication, in which there is no face
to observe. Words can explicitly (“I’m sad”) and implicitly (from tone) convey both thoughts
and feelings, whether the words are spoken or written.444 The written word is thus one very
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The most well-known of Mehrabian’s works on this subject are Albert Mehrabian & Susan R. Ferris, Inference of
Attitudes from Nonverbal Communication in Two Channels, 31 J . CONSULTING PSYCH. 3 (1967); Albert Mehrabian
& Morton Wiener, Decoding of Inconsistent Communications, 6. J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 113 (1967);
ALBERT MEHRABIAN, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION (1972).
441
KARPF, supra note 243, at 210.
442
Id. at 209.
443
Id. at 210.
444
Even writing can convey tone, albeit less fully than in speech. For example a writer might describe a speaker as
“dripping with sarcasm” or “sneering his words.” That writing can convey emotion should be no surprise to anyone
who loves novels, from tragedies, to comedies, romances, adventure stories, or the magic of Harry Potter. See also
CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 152 (noting that “the relative permanence of writing makes it ideally suited for such
functions as recording facts and communicating ideas” and that it increasingly serves social functions, such as the
well-wishes on birthday cards, the granting of certain social privileges as occurs with the driver’s license, or the
reporting of examination results that open or close doors to societal institutions and benefits.).

75

effective way to convey those portions of ourselves that we choose to disclose.445 Furthermore,
precisely because of the heightened risks from ambiguity, the written word may expose us to a
heightened risk of mis-definition.446 The damage done to our sense of identity can be magnified
still more by the permanence and ease of wide distribution of writings, quickly expanding the
circle of the community mis-judging us.447 For the state to compel a written communication
from a potential or actual criminal suspect is thus as invasive of mental privacy as is compelling
an oral communication, albeit in a subtly different way.
Nor does modern technological change undermine this conclusion. The phone creates
distance between the speaker and listener in an oral communication but retains most of the other
advantages of the spoken word.448 The computer makes the written word more easily deleted or
altered but also makes preserving and disseminating it easier as well.449 The internet is perhaps
the most significant technological tool, constituting, in the view of some commentators, an
entirely new medium, neither true writing nor speaking but a combination of both and of some
new features.450
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See id. at 157-58. Crystal explains:
Netspeak…is more than an aggregate of spoken and written features. Because it does things
that the other mediums do not do, it has to be seen as a new species of communication. It is
more than just a hybrid of speech and writing, or the result of contact between two longstanding mediums. Electronic texts, of whatever kind, are simply not the same as other kinds of
texts. They display fluidity, simultaneity (being available on an indefinite number of machines)
and non-degradability in copying; they transcend the traditional limitations on textual
dissemination; and they have permeable boundaries (because of the way one text may be
integrated within others or display links to others). Several of these properties have
consequences for language, and these combine with those associated with speech and writing to
make electronic communication a genuine “new medium.”
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For example, instant messages have the immediacy of face-to-face conversation but without
face or voice. E-mail is routinely deleted or altered yet uses the form of writing.451 E-mail
creates its own challenges in conveying paralinguistic cues similar to the voice but has developed
its own compensating conventions. Thus using all capital letters means to shout (to “flame”),
usually in anger;452 abbreviations like IMHO (“in my humble opinion”) and BTW (“by the way”)
soften words that might otherwise seem imperious; and “emoticons,” such as smiley-faces,
portray sadness, happiness, or confusion.453 Though in written form, however, most e-mails lack
the pre-planning and care of the written article, book, report, or even the personal letter.454
Conversations can also be more complex, as when multiple recipients join in “framing,” each
responding only to certain portions of a document, with responses to responses to responses
bouncing back-and-forth, creating a multi-voiced text.455 Hyper-links allow one document456
instantly to become many, joining many communicators rapidly across time and space.457 The
internet also creates its own unusual social dangers, such as the phenomenon of “group
polarization.”458 People of similar minds gravitate to the same websites, list serves, and chat
rooms. But persons who hear only echoes of their own views tend to hold them in a more
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KNOWLEDGE 17, 75, 92-98, 163, 186-88, 203-05, 215-16, 220-24 (2006) (similar, while also noting some
circumstances under which group polarization can promote positive social goods).
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extreme and intolerant fashion. They become polarized.459 On the other hand, under certain
conditions, the internet permits seemingly anonymous communication.460 This can encourage
freer exchange of ideas and more extensive experimentation with identity because personal
reprisals are impossible.461 But, for similar reasons, it can also encourage readier insults, more
spontaneous outbursts, and greater cruelty of expression.462 In sum, the internet raises the risk of
ill-planned and ambiguous text lacking contextual cues being disseminated to a wide and
intolerant audience that will nevertheless readily make globalized judgments about the author of
the communication.463 Compelled internet communications would, therefore, like compelled
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I am by no means suggesting that internet communications necessarily infringe on privacy. Indeed, there is
reason to believe that some internet users under certain conditions well short of complete anonymity are
nevertheless more willing to engage in self-disclosure than they would in other media. See id. at 151. But this is
partly so because many of these communications are to discrete groups of trusted individuals with whom one has
developed an on-line relationship, thus still being perceived as granting relative anonymity. John Hopkins
University technology professor Patricia Wallace put this point thus:
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Id. at 151. Greater self-disclosure on the net thus turns often on a perceived relative anonymity that partially shields
you from the full consequences of others’ judging eyes, thus offering a degree of protection of the self, but the risk
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risk is what triggers an entitlement to some measure of privacy-recognition.
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oral and written ones, wound personal identity, invading mental privacy in deeply disturbing
ways.
IV. Compulsion
The risk of mis-definition by others when we lose control over expressive self-revelation is
an incomplete explanation, however, for what is distinct about the privilege against selfincrimination. Suppose that A is talking to his friend B in the privacy of A’s home.
Unbeknownst to either person, the police have planted a bug in A’s living room, a bug installed
without probable cause or a warrant. The bug records A confessing a crime to B, without any
prompting by B, who is thoroughly surprised. A’s verbal confession of his guilt is meant to be
private in the sense of being something shared only with B. The Fourth Amendment protects
this privacy, and the confession, being overheard only because of the illegally-implanted bug,
will be suppressed at trial.464 But neither the state, nor, in this example, anyone else compelled A
to reveal what was on A’s mind. Accordingly, although the police did violate one constitutional
provision, they did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s protections.465
The privilege thus protects only against the compelled linguistic expression of thoughts or
feelings. Of course, compelled expression may conceivably violate both the privilege and the
Fourth Amendment, at least if, as at least one commentator has argued, the Fourth Amendment’s
privacy protections extend to confessions, thus requiring “interrogation warrants.”466 This
position is, however, one that the United States Supreme Court has never accepted.467 Thus, if
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the police compelled someone into confessing in a public place, that would violate the privilege
but, under current doctrine, not the Fourth Amendment.468 Compulsion, and not just by anyone
but by the state, is thus one key feature distinguishing the Fifth from the Fourth Amendment’s
privacy protections.469
But what is “compulsion,” and how can we detect its presence or absence? Those are in fact
not questions that I plan to answer here, and many other scholars have articulated their own
responses.470 What matters for my purposes is understanding why the Fifth Amendment requires
compulsion, for that is part of accomplishing my overriding task of justifying the Fifth
Amendment privilege’s existence in the first place. Why the Amendment requires compulsion
can indeed be answered without knowing precisely how its presence can be determined in any
individual case. There are three reasons: first, compelled expression involves the state in
actively changing the very thoughts and feelings that persons seek to keep private; second,
though relatedly, the words we speak or write shape our character; and third, state-compelled
confessions are degradation ceremonies that violate the proper boundaries between the state and
the individual in a decent, liberal society. State-compelled expression of thought and feeling, in
468
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at least these three respects, thus undermines the independence and uniqueness of human
personality as well as exposing us to mis-definition by others. Once again, under the privilege,
“[i]t is what a defendant may do with his lips - - what may issue from his mouth - - that is
considered worthy of special protection.”471
A. Expression Changes Thoughts and Feelings
The commonsense notion that expression is only about representing the information
residing in our minds is wrong. The very act of speaking or writing also changes the very
thoughts and feelings that we seek to express. Expression is thus usually, though not always, a
creative act.472
Dictionaries and custom give individual words their meaning.473 But each of us must choose
which words to speak, in what order and emphasis, with what purpose and tone.474 We seek to
convey complex concepts and emotions, and, in doing so, we may find that our words fail us, for
the words spoken then themselves become subject to our thoughts.475 Once a person speaks, her
words may reveal to her the fuzziness with which she holds her ideas or even the absence of any
coherent idea whatsoever when she initially thought that she had some great insight.476 Speaking
aloud may draw her attention to the ambiguity, or a confused listener may do so.477 She must

471

PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 29 (2000).
See TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 2-6 (2006) (noting also that “[l]anguage is not a vessel for
ideas; it also constitutes their very fabric.”).
473
See TIERSMA, supra note 437, at 115-20 (analyzing the roles of dictionaries and custom in defining words as they
are generally used and in the specialized context of the law).
474
See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 137-39 (making similar point in the context of writing).
475
See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 3, 5 (noting that “language, once in existence, becomes a subject of thought
itself.”).
476
See id. at 6 (making this point as to both the spoken and written word); CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 127
(emphasizing the value of rewriting as part of a process of clarifying and correcting thoughts).
477
See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 2 (discussing some of the advantages of speaking aloud), 7-9 (analyzing how
we fill in “expressive gaps,” that is, how we can find difficulty searching for the words to express our nascent
thoughts and feelings, difficulty that can reveal to us the need to clarify or modify our understanding of the matter
involved).
472

81

then abandon or refine the thought or find another in its place.478 This process may begin with
internal self-conversation, but it eventually requires some utterance, whether to one’s self or to
an imagined or real audience. New words are required.479
Words can also help us to understand that which silence only confounds. We may feel grief
but cannot fully know its meaning for our lives, its portents for the future, or how to cope with it
until we speak it aloud or share it with others.480
Writers may be acutely aware of these processes. Words put down on paper can reveal gaps
(to author and reader) in previously inchoate arguments or reveal gaps in what at first seemed to
be airtight syllogisms.481 Typing or handwriting a particular word may reveal its ambiguity or its
status as a poor choice to convey a point, requiring the author to wrestle seriously with just what
is his point.482 The act of writing may reveal the poverty of a position or send an intellectual
inquiry or emotional journey into new, unexpected directions.483 The words we write can also
reveal the incompleteness in our thoughts and feelings or their expression, sending us on a quest
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to fill the gaps.484 A thought is an embryonic word, a word an infant thought.485 British legal
philosopher Timothy Macklem summarized these points:
When we put our thoughts and feelings into words and phrases, and so turn
them into spoken or written language, whether for our own benefit or for the
benefit of some other, when we sketch our response to a scene before us and
so turn that response into line and shading, when we whistle or when we hum,
we are necessarily, if modestly, creative. We start to say something, as an
attempt to capture some aspect of what we think or feel, and as we say it our
speech gains a suggestive momentum of its own, so that what begins as a
limited perspective upon a richer thought soon acquires a life that outstrips the
bounds of the original thought, inspiring new thoughts that depart from the
original in ways that were neither foreseen nor foreseeable in advance.486
Words have inherent value too. Merely choosing to speak to another can be a heartening
victory for a shy man. A writer recognizing that he has chosen the perfect word to capture a
thought rejoices. In both instances, the pleasure comes from the talking or the writing
independently from the content of the words chosen.487
Even our memory is partly constituted by our words.488 Memories are not photographs of
events but reconstructions of them.489 Our biases, self-interest, intervening life experiences, and
myriad other factors combine to create our memories.490 Ample research shows that what we say
can alter this creative process.491 For example, an eyewitness describing an assailant becomes
more likely to identify someone from a lineup as the offender if he matches that description than
would be the case if the witness were asked to identify the true offender’s face when the witness
484
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had given no description at all.492 There is also evidence that confessing can itself alter the
confessor’s recollection of events.493
Words can also constitute parts of our social word. Entreaties, promises, denials, admissions
consist of words or their equivalent.494 But the very act of bringing these social facts into
existence changes the social world we inhabit and our feelings about it.495 One to whom a
promise is made on an important matter, for example, often expects its fulfillment and plans for
the future accordingly, a matter of grave consequence if the promise-maker is a police officer,
the promise-taker a suspect.496
More broadly, words alter our relationships with others. 497 Lengthy conversations involving
self-disclosure create an intimacy between former acquaintances, who now slowly mutate into
friends.498 Words of comfort turn a distant co-worker into a respected colleague, words of
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advice turn a teacher into a mentor.499 Words can turn relationships unpleasant too. An angry
tirade by a lover can break bonds of trust, by a boss can intimidate, just as words of boasting can
sometimes raise the speaker’s status at the expense of the listener’s.500
A “room of one’s own,”501 the isolated privacy of one’s mind, is necessary to fostering
creativity and distinctiveness, for, without fear of scrutiny or knowledge of all social
expectations, we can let our mind and heart wander where they will.502 But a life of endless
isolation is impoverished, missing others’ perspectives, new information, and the bonds to other
individuals, families, groups, institutions, and nations that combine to become important parts of
the unique persons we are.503 When the state plays too active and large a role in interfering with
our choices about what to reveal, when, how, and why through our words, they alter the very
thoughts and feelings that make us who we are.504 Each individual and group is always to some
extent molded by the law and by other acts of the state.505 But when the state actively intervenes
on a very personal level to prompt us to speak, it invades and commandeers our personalities in a
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way that makes that speech and what it says about who we are far less than it otherwise would
have been a matter truly of our own choice.506
B. Words Shape Character
If thoughts and feelings are components of who we are, their combination and evolution
over time help to constitute our character, our more enduring ways of experiencing and acting
upon the world.507 The sum of who we are is, however, more than the combination of these
parts, for together we turn them into a unique, defining, individual life story, a tale that is us.508
A person who is thus ten years old today will, in twenty years, have different attitudes,
beliefs, goals, and desires. He may have fewer organs, such as the removal of his gall bladder,
may be fatter or thinner, more or less energetic. Even at the molecular level, the precise
molecules constituting his body will have changed. Yet he and others will still think of him as
the same person, as “Hank Jones” and not suddenly “Clay Smith.”509
What explains this sense of individual continuity is the narrative coherence of human lives.
We each tell ourselves stories that link together the different phases of our lives.510 Our sense of
self largely consists of these stories.511 “Our plannings, our rememberings, even our loving and
hating, are guided by narrative plots.”512 Narratives, of course, move through time, having a
beginning, a middle, and an end.513 One cannot, therefore, be a person at a single moment in
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time.514 To be a person is to be the combination of what you were, are, and will be.515 The
narrative nature of personhood does not make it a fiction. The narrative is who you are.516
Every act of expression affects each person’s life story. What we say or not, how we say it
or instead convey silence, when, and to whom is a choice about how each of us sees ourselves
and wants others to see us.517 Though sometimes made quickly, we do not make these choices
lightly. In part, we are what we do, and words are a form of action.518 If we lie, that may
reinforce our self-image as a liar or undermine our image as a truthteller. Even if we start out as
generally truthful, repeated lies makes us more comfortable with deceit until it becomes integral
to our character.519 If we challenge authority, that makes us defiant. Every word uttered or not
is another chapter in our story, an expressive choice that makes us, in some significant way, the
authors of our lives. These choices, explains one legal theorist:
become creative if and when they are, prospectively or retrospectively,
made part of the story of a life, where the idea of a story is understood, not
simply as a factual record, but as the narrative of a personal encounter with
value, the development, recollection, and recounting of which has become a
source of value in its own right. People typically aspire to be at least part
authors of their own lives, and the metaphor of authorship is an apt one, not
because people often function creatively in making the decisions that govern
the shape and direction of their lives, but also because in doing so they are
very often conscious of the narrative implications of their decisions,
sufficiently so as to take those implications to be elements of great weight in
514
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the assessment of their reasons for action. They decide the course of their
life at any given moment in much the same way that authors do with respect
to fictional lives, so as to develop the character, style, and plot of their
particular life story.520
To be compelled to speak certain sorts of words at a certain time, in a certain setting is to lose
control over your own life’s tale in a profound way, to make you something you were not and
did not originally choose to be. You become the state’s creature more than your own. You cease
to write the tale that is you, passing authorship to your interrogators. You are re-defined.521
C. Confession as a Degradation Ceremony
One argument often made in favor of interrogation by the state is that confession is good
for the soul.522 The police are doing little more than appealing to conscience, and to confess
because one’s conscience is pricked is to cleanse the soul, a rational, free choice and the first step
on the road to redemption.523
But what is a conscience? A conscience is a personal commitment to a set of reasons meant
to be given special weight in guiding our actions.524 Because a conscience involves
commitment, it cannot be readily tossed aside or altered.525 Moreover, were it to change too
520
521

522

MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 30.
See supra notes 504-05 and accompanying text.
Justice Scalia forcefully stated this position:
[I]t is wrong, and subtly corrosive of our criminal justice system, to regard an honest confession
as a mistake. While every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous for the wrongdoer
to admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves. Not only for society, but for the
wrongdoer himself, admission of guilt, if not coerced, is inherently desirable because it
advances the goals of both justice and rehabilitation….We should, then, rejoice at the “poor
fool” who has made [an honest confession]; and we should regret the attempted retraction of
that good act rather than seek to facilitate and encourage it. To design our laws on premises
contrary to these is to abandon belief in either personal responsibility or the moral claim of just
government to obedience.

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id.
524
See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 101-02.
525
See id. On the nature of commitment, see RUBENFELD, supra note 509, at 91-102; R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 50 (2001).
523

88

rapidly, it would fail to give us the stability and continuity in behavior necessary to achieving
certain longer-term life goals, including the person we wish to be in the future.526 The dictates of
conscience stem from a combination of our upbringing, close personal attachments, long-term
goals, and accumulated rational choices about our live’s direction.527 Conscience reminds us, in
the face of more tempting and immediate reasons, of our longer and deeper goals.528 Yet
conscience must nevertheless be subject to slow change and periodic re-evaluation, to making
informed choices about its wisdom and content.529 Otherwise, it is no longer our commitments
but the commitments of others, or of some old and temporally-isolated version of ourselves, that
governs our actions.530 Moreover, we must be alert to when our conscience degenerates into a
mere concern for the image of who we are rather than the reality or becomes a source of bias or
empty standards.531 Nor is our conscience always our best guide, for it may in some situations
conflict with other compelling reasons for action or reveal the inadequacy or incompleteness of
the code our conscience embodies in addressing the strange or the extreme.532 Above all,
therefore, conscience must be of our own making, and we do not truly act from conscience
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unless it is we who instigate action.533 Where others seek to appeal to our conscience,
particularly in ways designed to manipulate us for their own ends, they can injure our
conscience, turning its virtue into vice.534
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s story of the “stolen ribbon” in book 2 of his Confessions
illustrates the point.535 Rousseau and a young kitchen maid had once been servants in the home
of Madame de Vercellis. Upon her death, Rousseau stole one of her ribbons to give to the
kitchen maid as a sign of affection. The executor of the estate, Comte de la Roque, discovered
the ribbon missing, it being found among Rousseau’s things. Comte de la Roque publicly
summoned Rousseau to explain how the ribbon came into his possession. Rousseau accused
Marion, the very kitchen maid who was the object of Rousseau’s affection, of being the thief,
insisting it was she who gave the ribbon to him. When she denied the charge, Comte de la Roque
fired them both, uncertain of the truth, in the hope that the conscience of the guilty one would
avenge the plight of the innocent. Rousseau’s conscience did plague him, but it did not prod him
to tell the truth at the time, and it is partly this that tortures him. “She was present in my
thoughts; I excused myself on the first object that came to hand,”536 wrote Rousseau. “I accused
her,” he continued, “of having done what I wanted to do and of having given me the ribbon since
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it was my intention to give it to her.”537 Nor did Rousseau confess his guilt to anyone, not even
to family or friends, until many years later, when writing the Confessions.538 Rousseau further
bemoaned the way that de la Roque’s actions had blocked Rousseau’s conscience from operating
as it should. One commentator summed up Rousseau’s reasoning:
Thus we have a problem in desire which, thwarted in its intent, gives way to
its apparent opposite, the wish to punish. If only his accusers had given him
time to repent, and the opportunity to confess privately, he would have told
the truth. But public exposure, the risk of being publicly declared a thief and
a liar, is too strong for him to perform on the spot the confession he wants to
make - - and now makes so many years later.539
Conscience needs time and a modicum of privacy to do its work rightly. The public nature of
the accusation and the implicit threat of penalties make Rousseau into just what he feared the
truth would reveal: an informant, a liar, a disloyal would-be lover, a selfish hypocrite motivated
by fear rather than courage, vice rather than virtue. Rousseau was, of course, already a thief, but
public questioning by those more powerful than he, followed by an appeal to conscience, made
him into something far worse. If we are, to a large extent, what we do, Rousseau’s later guilt
pangs did little to erase the stain from his cowardly actions, a character wounded by the
compulsion to make him confess. It is hard to see how modern interrogation by the police is any
better on this score. Although the suspect is alone with the police,540 that is not the sort of
privacy that conscience requires, for the police are themselves a symbol and arm of the public,
charged with doing its will.541 A confession under such circumstances is not a private revelation
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by a criminal to the one he has wronged but an effort to degrade the subject’s will to the service
of his tormentors.542
Even had Rousseau told the truth, his interrogation would still have been a degradation
ceremony. As the Court detailed, albeit in other words, in Miranda, the very purpose of
interrogation is to degrade the suspect, to make him less, his questioners more.543 If autonomy is
central to making us the author of our own stories, the interrogator’s goal is to compromise that
autonomy, writing the next chapter for us. Placed in a situation where the suspect is dependent
upon his interrogators, then asked to confess, his motives for speaking will be different from the
sincere penitent. Even if sincerity is part of what drives the interrogatee, the risk of his motives
being “aberrant,”544 of speaking in significant part out of hopelessness, confusion, or fear, is
great.545 Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,546 albeit writing about the due
process clause, took this argument to its extreme:
It probably is the normal instinct to deny and conceal any shameful or guilty
act. Even a “voluntary confession” is not likely to be the product of the
same motives with which one may volunteer information that does not
incriminate or concern him. The term “voluntary confession” does not
mean voluntary in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one’s
soul of a sense of guilt. “Voluntary confessions” in criminal law are the
product of calculations of a different order, and usually proceed from a
belief that further denial is useless and perhaps prejudicial. To speak of any
confessions of crime made after arrest as being “voluntary” or “uncoerced”
is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional.
A confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a guilty
person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser. The Court
bases its decision on the premise that custody and examination of a prisoner
for thirty-six hours is “inherently coercive.” Of course it is. And so is
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custody and detention for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and
so is detention.547
Jackson here dissents from the majority’s finding of coercion, arguing that the legal concept
tolerates much more pressure than does the commonsense concept.548 But the commonsense
concept of “coercion” that he so aptly describes is much akin to the Miranda Court’s definition
of “compulsion,” using similar reasoning to conclude that custodial interrogation, absent
warnings and the opportunity to consult with counsel, was “inherently compelling.”549
Confession has long been the “queen of proofs” in our culture.550 Police seek confessions
even when there is ample independent evidence of guilt.551 Words, in our culture, perhaps all
cultures, have power.552 They can be sacred or profane, rousing or soothing. But, whatever they
are, we need them. The interrogation ritual seeks to compel the suspect to part with his words,
both because they can be a window into his soul and because, by confessing, he is marked with a
status as a lesser being.553 To be humiliated or shamed is to be changed. “To participate in a
547
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ritual that is personally repugnant”554 is indecent, a hallmark of an illiberal, “uncivilized”
society.555 To be the sort of person who bows in subjection to the state is to abandon the defiant
character that a republic requires.556 When it is the state doing the humiliating, it invades the
“private” in a very important way, for it erodes the boundaries of personhood to let in the power
of the state.557 It is the state’s act of compelling words that does this damage to the self, a redefinition and normalizing of the unique self.558 Yet, even when these words include “factual
truth,” they provide only a partial perspective on the speaker’s full and complex nature, and they
once again subject the speaker to mis-definition by the crowd.559
None of these comments are made to suggest that interrogations should never be permitted,
nor even that state compulsion must flatly be barred. There are always competing, often
weightier, interests, and, no matter the express language of the Fifth Amendment, the Court
frequently and properly balances the values served by the privilege against competing needs.560
Nor do I mean to glorify offenders, many of whom are less than admirable human beings, some
of whom commit truly heinous crimes, and the bulk of whom probably merit some punishment.
But state compelled revelation of our thoughts and feelings in words does do violence to the soul
and to the political culture that permits it. Even if such violence is sometimes necessary, it should
be avoided, or at least minimized, whenever possible, and that is the reason for being for the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination’s compulsion requirement.
V. Conclusion
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The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, I have argued here, is best
understood as being central to promoting the human voice. In this article, I have centered on one
of the two sorts of voices that matter - - the literal voice - - leaving discussion of the
metaphorical voice for another day. Only once the metaphorical voice is more fully explained
will I be ready to resolve many of the conundrums raised by the privilege.561 Nevertheless, this
article has, I hope, laid the first brick in the foundation. Preventing compelled speech via the
literal voice protects against the distortion of human character caused by loss of control over our
own words and protects the reluctant speaker from thereby being mis-defined by his audience.
To lose control over self-definition is a drastic interference with human autonomy and a grave
insult to human worth. The privilege is not so much about the privacy of our thoughts as of our
words and, in ways too often unappreciated, our words define our very nature.
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